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ABSTRACT 
News coverage of high profile criminal matters has increased in South Africa. Such matters are 
of public concern, as every citizen has a right to receive and impart information and to debate 
openly and frankly matters which are of public concern, including matters before the courts. 
The legitimacy of the courts is dependent on robust media reportage and public scrutiny of 
judicial matters which such reportage stimulates. However, criminal trials of high profile 
accused persons such as Oscar Pistorius, Shrien Dewani and J Arthur Brown, turn easily into a 
show with strong entertainment value, giving the media strong profitmaking reasons to cover 
it. In their pursuit of profit and in seeking to satisfy the curiosity of their readers, listeners or 
viewers, the media regularly resort to trial by media or adverse pre-trial publicity. Trial by 
media is nothing more than commercially motivated expression which does not warrant 
constitutional protection. 
At the receiving end of such coverage are accused persons. Public censure of crime and 
of accused persons which follows trial by media should not be imposed on the innocent. The 
right to a fair trial requires that an accused be treated fairly from the inception of the criminal 
process, from which point the person suspected of committing the crime in question is 
considered innocent. Any pre-trial process which implies that the accused is guilty, including 
any such process influenced by media reports surrounding criminal offences, violates the 
presumption of innocence. 
Despite the availability of remedies, the media in South Africa usually are not held to 
account for their actions and persist with adverse, biased and irresponsible pre-trial reporting. 
Courts have shown a tendency to protect the media in these cases, despite the effect of such 
reporting on the judicial process, the administration of justice and the fair trial rights of 
accused persons. The reason for this is usually the hesitation on the part of judges to 
recognise their susceptibility to extraneous matters. Judges should not be placed in a position 
where their independence and impartiality are questioned as a result of media sensationalism. 
Where the media create mistrust in the integrity of the judiciary, the rule of law is in peril. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
RESEARCH FRAMEWORK 
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
The media coverage of the criminal trials of Oscar Pistorius, Shrien Dewani and J Arthur Brown 
illustrated well the role of the media in pre-trial reporting. The case of Oscar Pistorius, in 
particular, attracted enormous media attention from the outset and elicited public outrage, 
which included protest action at the court where he appeared. The facts and circumstances of 
the case, as well as the forensic investigations and Pistorius’s arrest, were covered extensively 
in both the electronic and print media prior to his bail application and subsequent trial. Such 
coverage included stories on Pistorius’s sporting achievements and sensationalised his 
participation in any social activities after the death of his girlfriend. Media reports tended to 
speak also to the character of Pistorius, reflecting on his supposed temper outbursts as 
perceived by friends. These reports affected Pistorius’s public image significantly and led to the 
publication of various views pertaining to his guilt prior to the actual trial. 
Further, the media were allowed complete coverage of the Pistorius trial as it unfolded 
in court. This was accompanied by twenty-four hour news programming, which covered 
discussions on evidence, strategy and opinions in all media forms on every trial day. This 
coverage spawned further views pertaining to his guilt during the trial. Pistorius was not given 
the benefit of being presumed innocent until proved guilty and this was due largely to the 
media attention given to his trial. 
John J Smyth QC, Director of the Justice Alliance of South Africa, felt it necessary to 
declare that: 
Trial by media is always an antithesis of the rule of law. It is difficult to escape the 
conclusion that the licence permitted to the media in the Pistorius case is hardly 
likely to encourage the English courts to extradite Dewani.1 
                                                          
1 Legalbrief Today (28 February 2013). 
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The murder of Anni Dewani also attracted extensive media coverage. Murder accused, Shrien 
Dewani, opposed the extradition application brought by South African authorities. One of the 
grounds upon which he relied was that he would not receive a fair trial in South Africa. The 
extensive media coverage detailing Shrien Dewani’s alleged involvement contributed greatly to 
his opposing the extradition application. This led to lengthy court battles to have him extradited 
to and face trial in South Africa. The then Police Commissioner, General Bheki Cele, was quoted 
by the media at the time as saying: 
A monkey came all the way from London to have his wife murdered here. Shrien 
thought we, South Africans, were stupid when he came all the way to kill his wife in 
our country. He lied to himself.2 
Cele had apportioned guilt to Dewani prior to any formal hearing of the matter. It was views 
such as these, reflected in the local and international media, which Dewani’s legal team cited as 
the pre-trial mentality which may influence the independence and objectivity of the judiciary 
and the fair trial rights of their client. Dewani eventually stood trial and was acquitted, which 
prompted public questioning of the objectivity of the presiding judge. The general public, 
influenced by the media coverage of the matter, already had convicted Dewani and expected 
the judge to do likewise. 
The corruption and fraud case of J Arthur Brown also enjoyed extensive media 
attention. The media launched scathing attacks on Brown during their pre-trial coverage of his 
case. Whilst proclaiming his innocence, Brown alleged that the media portrayal had resulted in 
the general public, some judicial officers and certain lawyers viewing him as a fraudster and 
thief who stole billions from widows and orphans. The media created a perception that there 
already had been a verdict on the allegations against him, a fact confirmed by Henny J in 
Brown.3 
The cases of Pistorius, Dewani and Brown enjoyed extensive media coverage and, more 
often than not, depending on the reporting source, the accused were at the receiving end of 
adverse pre-trial publicity. Such publicity tends to diminish the integrity of the accused and may 
                                                          
2 The Telegraph (9 December 2010). 
3 Brown v National Director of Public Prosecutions and Others (2012) 1 All SA 61 (WCC) 76. 
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affect his ability to defend himself in a trial arena which may have become tainted by such 
reporting. 
1.2 Problem Statement 
Freedom of expression is not a right of the media as such, but a right of every person to hear, 
form and express opinions and views freely on a wide range of matters.4 Therefore, as the 
primary source of information and news, it is the duty of the media to provide citizens both 
with information and a platform for the exchange of ideas which is crucial to the development 
of a democratic culture.5 The media must disseminate information and ideas with strength, 
courage, integrity and responsibility.6 This is their constitutional obligation, and the media are 
protected in the performance of their obligations to the broader society by the provisions of 
section 16 of the Constitution, which guarantees the right to freedom of expression. It is crucial, 
therefore, that the media disseminate information and news in the public interest. 
Irresponsible, inaccurate and biased pre-trial publicity presents or may present a 
problem for accused persons in South Africa. The cases of Pistorius, Dewani and Brown are key 
examples of the pre-trial publicity to which high-profile matters are subjected. Such publicity 
has the potential to undermine the administration of justice, the rights of an accused and the 
interests of the victims of crime.7 
However, the argument by an accused that he or she will not receive a fair trial due to 
adverse pre-trial publicity or an application by an accused to restrain the media is unlikely to 
succeed under current South African law.8 In Brown, the court held that although the pre-trial 
publicity was adverse to the accused and created the impression with the public that there 
already had been a verdict in the matter, the applicant was unable to prove that the adverse 
media coverage led to any trial related prejudices. The court’s reasoning was that judges are 
                                                          
4 South African Broadcasting Corporation Limited v National Director of Public Prosecutions and Others 
2007 (1) SA 523 (CC) 535. 
5 Khumalo and others v Holomisa 2002 (5) SA 401(CC) 417. 
6 Khumalo v Holomisa 417.  
7 Law Commission of India (2006: 15). 
8 See Midi Television (Pty) Ltd v Director of Public Prosecutions (WC) (2007) 3 All SA 318 (SCA) and Brown v 
National Director of Public Prosecutions and Others (2012) 1 All SA 61 (WCC). 
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unlikely to be influenced by extraneous matters and will decide issues only on the facts before 
them. In Midi Television, the court rejected the argument by the Director of Public Prosecutions 
(DPP) that the broadcasting of a documentary relating to a pending criminal trial would 
prejudice the administration of justice.9 According to both De Vos10 and Stevenson,11 Midi 
Television effectively put an end to the sub judice rule in South African law.12 They view the 
case as a victory for press freedom. 
It is evident from the strict tests laid down in Midi Television and Brown that our courts 
are reluctant to limit freedom of expression. This is because the right to freedom of expression 
is not only a media right but also a general public right to information about court cases. 
However, the media, in providing this vital information to the  public, use this platform to 
produce adverse pre-trial reporting and trial by media, knowing that they likely will be 
protected by the courts. It is a case, therefore, of the courts not seeing the proverbial fox in the 
hen house. 
1.3 Research Questions 
Is the right to freedom of expression unduly favoured by the courts at the expense of the right 
to a fair trial? Do the media exploit the right to freedom of expression to produce adverse pre-
trial publicity and conduct trial by media? And do the media rely upon their excesses being 
indulged by the courts who consider freedom of expression to include the right of the general 
public to receive information? These questions will be assessed by considering, firstly, the 
obligations of the media under section 16 of the Constitution; secondly, the relationship 
between adverse pre-trial publicity and speech in the public interest; and, lastly, the efficacy of 
the current remedies available to accused persons when adverse pre-trial publicity threatens 
the right to a fair trial. 
 
                                                          
9 Midi Television (Pty) Ltd v Director of Public Prosecutions (WC) (2007) 3 All SA 318 (SCA) 325. See further 
§5.2 below. 
10 Constitutionally Speaking (18 February 2013). 
11 Stevenson (2007). 
12 Midi Television (Pty) Ltd v Director of Public Prosecutions (Western Cape) 2007 (9) BCLR 958 (SCA). 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za
5 
1.4 Literature Review 
There is little academic writing in South Africa which deals with the limitation of the right to 
freedom of expression in order to protect fair trial rights. The writing which is available tends to 
emphasise the right of the press to freedom of expression and to promote the importance of a 
free press. For example, as noted above, Stevenson welcomes the decision in the Midi 
Television case and concludes that it was a victory for press freedom and freedom of 
expression.13 So, too, does De Vos.14 
Swanepoel’s is the only academic essay supporting the view that freedom of the press 
should be limited and that the administration of justice and the right of the accused to a fair 
trial should be protected. She argues in favour of the sub judice rule “as a mechanism to limit 
the prejudgment of issues in pending or imminent criminal litigation, which when offended may 
constitute contempt of court ex facie curiae”.15 She considers that the sub judice rule allows for 
protection of the authority of the courts, as required by sections 7, 165(3) and 165(4) of the 
Constitution, and for the protection of the right to a fair trial. 
Vast international academic writing exists on this topic.16 Here the focal argument is 
that freedom of speech is not an absolute right, and should be limited when it threatens the 
right of an accused to a fair trial or when it threatens the administration of justice. Some of 
these writings will be referred to later. 
1.5 Outline of Remaining Chapters 
Chapter Two will discuss the rights and obligations of the media in terms of section 16 of the 
Constitution. The chapter will assess whether adverse pre-trial publicity can be deemed 
information in the public interest. It will consider also whether the media are failing in their 
constitutional obligations when they resort to publicity purely in their own interests. This will 
be done with reference to the pecuniary interest of the media in pre-trial publicity. 
                                                          
13 Stevenson (2007). 
14 Constitutionally Speaking (18 February 2013). 
15 Swanepoel (2006: 3). 
16 See, for example, Battaglia (2012), Duncan (2008), Freedman & Burke (1996), Hudon (1966), Rollings & 
Blascovich (1977), Bruschke & Loges (2003), and Leaffer (2007). 
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Chapter Three will discuss the right of an accused to a fair trial and will highlight specific 
rights in section 35 of the Constitution which may be affected by adverse pre-trial publicity. It 
will assess the effect of pre-trial publicity on the integrity of an accused and on his ability to 
defend himself. It will examine also whether the negative impact of pre-trial publicity may 
affect the accused’s trust in the fairness of the trial. Reference will be made to South African 
and foreign case law. 
Chapters Four and Five will examine the mechanisms available to an accused who may 
wish to protect his fair trial rights against pre-trial publicity or limit the negative impact of 
media coverage. Chapter 4 will focus on applications for stay of criminal prosecution as a 
possible mechanism against adverse pre-trial publicity. The chapter will explore the approach of 
the courts to such applications in the Banana17 and Brown cases. The Shaik cases will be 
considered also.18 In Chapter 5, prior restraint orders and the sub judice rule will be discussed in 
order to assess whether they constitute justifiable and proportional limits upon freedom of 
speech. The Midi Television case will be analysed critically. 
Chapter 6 will conclude the study and suggest an alternative approach, with the sub 
judice rule at its core. The chapter will consider a statutory enactment to ensure that the fair 
trial rights of an accused are not sacrificed at the altar of freedom of express. 
 
 
 
                                                          
17 Banana v Attorney General (1998) JOL 2265 (ZS). 
18 S v Shaik and Others [2005] 3 All SA 211 (D) and Shaik v The State (2007) 2 All SA 9 (SCA). 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Responsible journalism is supported by the Constitution and should be endorsed 
and encouraged by society and government institutions, including the judiciary.1 
This chapter deals with the right to freedom of expression. The focus of the chapter is on the 
rights and obligations of the media when they report on pending criminal cases, as these cases 
often bring into conflict the right to freedom of expression and the right to a fair trial. The 
chapter will reflect also on the pecuniary interest of the media in pre-trial reporting. Their 
coverage of several high profile criminal matters will be analysed in an effort to determine 
whether the information disseminated is information in the public interest or whether said 
coverage is motivated primarily by profit, with the information being provided for 
entertainment purposes. 
An attempt will be made also to ascertain whether or not adverse pre-trial publicity or 
trial by media qualifies as responsible journalism which should be protected by the 
Constitution, especially when it is on a collision course with the fair trial rights of an accused or 
the administration of justice. 
2.2 South African Law 
In South Africa freedom of expression is a fundamental right guaranteed by the section 16 of 
the Constitution. The section reads: 
(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of expression, which includes— 
(a) freedom of the press and other media; 
(b) freedom to receive or impart information or ideas; 
(c) freedom of artistic creativity; and 
(d) academic freedom and freedom of scientific research 
(2) The right in subsection (1) does not extend to— 
(a) propaganda for war; 
(b) incitement of imminent violence; or 
                                                          
1 Stevenson (2007: 618). 
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(c) advocacy of hatred that is based on race, ethnicity, gender or religion, and that 
constitutes incitement to cause harm. 
As is evident, section 16 is divided into two parts.2 Section 16(1) deals with expression which is 
protected by the Constitution while section 16(2) deals with expression that is excluded from 
constitutional protection. 
Pre-trial publicity is the coverage by the media of pending criminal trials. Coverage starts 
within hours of the arrest of suspects and will continue throughout the investigation until the 
accused appears and pleads in a court of law. It is expression protected by section 16(1)(a) & (b) 
of the Constitution. The media are the bearers of this right in terms of section 16(1)(a). 
According to section 16(1)(b), the media are free to disseminate news on pending criminal trials 
to the public which, accordingly, has a right to receive such news. 
The question is whether adverse pre-trial publicity and trial by media are speech which 
is protected by section 16(1) or whether they constitute speech which is excluded from 
constitutional protection by section 16(2). According to Milo, Penfold & Stein, section 16(2) is 
definitional in the sense that: 
Certain expression does not deserve constitutional protection because, among 
other things, the expression has the potential to impinge adversely on the dignity of 
others and cause grave harm.3 
Adverse pre-trial publicity could harm the rights of an accused. The dignity of an accused could 
be harmed also, in that the consequences of adverse pre-trial publicity for its victims often 
include the destruction of private lives and of innocence.4 Further, such publicity could lead to 
threats of physical harm once news of the arrest of a suspect is disseminated to the public. 
On 9 July 2014, a pastor was arrested for the suspected killing and dismembering of the 
body of a four-year-old boy in Pongola, KwaZulu-Natal.5 The community was outraged and 
some of its members proceeded to torch the church and house of the suspect. They demanded 
also that the suspect be released to them. Fifteen community members were arrested for 
public violence after they set fire to the courthouse. Although the suspect was released later 
                                                          
2 Islamic Unity Convention v Independent Broadcasting Authority & Others 2002 (4) SA 294 (CC) 308. 
3 Milo, Penfold & Stein (2013: 6). 
4 Greer & McLaughlin (2012: 399). 
5 The Times Live (9 July 2014). 
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without charge and another suspect was arrested,6 it is such news coverage that put him at real 
risk of physical harm, even death. The suspect was condemned even before being tried by a 
court of law. The coverage detailed the circumstances of the murder, which included evidence 
found at the supposed scene of the crime. Anybody reading this news story could conclude 
easily that the pastor was the perpetrator of the crime. Is this the kind of speech which should 
be excluded from constitutional protection? 
The news coverage itself does not incite violence, but describing the circumstances of 
the offence in such a manner that the lay public inevitably concludes that the suspect is guilty 
may lead to violence which could see the community kill an innocent man. It could be argued, 
therefore, that speech such as this could incite violence and should be denounced under 
section 16(2) of the Constitution. However, it is doubtful that this argument will succeed as it is 
expression which is not identified specifically by section 16(2). Potential incitement of imminent 
violence is not the same as actual incitement of imminent violence and the courts will be loath 
to accept that it is. 
In Islamic Unity, the court held that any expression that is not specifically excluded 
under section 16(2) enjoys protection.7 Even expression such as child pornography8 or nude 
dancing9 that does not serve any of the values underlying the protection of freedom of 
expression, prima facie, is protected.10 Thus, it was held in De Reuck that all and any expression, 
save for that which is clearly excluded under section 16(2), is protected11 and any restriction 
must be justified under the section 36 limitations enquiry.12 In Phillips, the lower court held that 
expressive activity, such as nude dancing, prima facie is protected no matter how repulsive, 
degrading, offensive or unacceptable society might consider it to be.13 Subsequently, the 
Constitutional Court put the judgment of the lower court into context, holding that the right to 
freedom of expression is not absolute and that it may be limited by a law of general application 
                                                          
6 News 24 (21 July 2014). 
7 Islamic Unity Convention v Independent Broadcasting Authority & Others 309. 
8 De Reuck v Director of Public Prosecutions 2004 (1) SA 406 (CC). 
9 Phillips and Another v Director of Public Prosecutions, WLD, and Others 2003 (4) BCLR 357 (CC) 363. 
10 Milo, Penfold & Stein (2013: 7). 
11 De Reuck v Director of Public Prosecutions 429-430. 
12 De Reuck v Director of Public Prosecutions 430. 
13 Phillips and Another v Director of Public Prosecutions (WLD) and Others 2002 (2) SACR 375 (W) 379. 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za
10 
that complies with section 36 of the Constitution.14 In other words, expression that is repulsive, 
degrading, offensive or unacceptable may be limited to the extent that the limitation is 
justifiable in terms of section 36.15 
Adverse pre-trial publicity or trial by media constitutes a form of expression that prima 
facie is protected by section 16(1) as it is not excluded expressly by section 16(2). It is subject, 
however, to limitation in terms of section 36 of the Constitution. 
2.3 International Law 
Freedom of expression is recognised in international law as a fundamental right and is 
protected by various international and regional conventions, charters and covenants. For 
example, Article 19 of both the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) guarantees the right to freedom of 
opinion and expression. Freedom of expression is protected also by Article 9 of the African 
Charter on Human and People’s Rights (ACHPR). In other words, adverse pre-trial publicity and 
trial by media fall within the forms of expression which enjoy protection under international 
law. 
However, under international law, as under South African law, freedom of expression is 
not absolute. It is a right that may be limited. Thus, Article 19(3) of the ICCPR allows for 
restrictions which are16 provided by law and are necessary. Also, article 9(2) of the ACHPR 
requires that the right to express and disseminate opinions be exercised within the law. What is 
more, the meaning and extent of the right to freedom of expression in international law should 
be comprehended with reference to the Madrid Principles on the Relationship between the 
Media and Judicial Independence. 
2.3.1 Madrid Principles 
In 1994, a group of 40 legal experts and representatives of the media met in Madrid, Spain. The 
purpose of the meeting, firstly, was to examine the relationship between the media and judicial 
                                                          
14 Phillips v Director of Public Prosecutions 2003 (3) SA 345 (CC) 364. 
15 Phillips v Director of Public Prosecutions 2003 (3) SA 345 (CC) 364. 
16 Article 19(3) of the ICCPR and Article 9(2) of the ACHPR. 
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independence and, secondly, to formulate principles addressing the relationship between 
freedom of expression and judicial independence. 
The preamble to the Principles states that freedom of the media is important in a 
democratic society, that it is the responsibility of judges to recognise and give effect to freedom 
of the media, and that any restrictions on that freedom should be permitted only if they are 
authorised by the ICCPR and are specified in precise law. However, it was recognised by the 
participants that, in exercising this freedom, the media have an obligation to respect the rights 
of individuals and the independence of the judiciary. 
The meeting formulated a Basic Principle as a minimum standard to govern the 
relationship between freedom of expression and judicial independence. This Basic Principle 
provides that: 
(1) Freedom of expression, including freedom of the media, is one of the essential 
foundations of a democratic society. It is the function and right of the media to 
gather and bring information to the public and to comment on the 
administration of justice, including cases before, during and after trial, without 
violating the presumption of innocence. 
(2) This principle can be departed from only in the circumstances envisaged in the 
ICCPR, as interpreted by the 1984 Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and 
Derogation Provisions in the ICCPR. 
(3) The right to comment on the administration of justice shall not be subject to any 
special restrictions. 
In relation to criminal proceedings, the Basic Principle may be limited, where necessary, to 
prevent serious prejudice to an accused and to prevent harm to or improper pressure being 
placed upon a witness, a member of a jury or a victim.17 
Further, paragraph 2 of the Basic Principle provides for departures only in terms of 
section 38 of the Siracusa Principles, which stipulates that:  
All trials shall be public unless the Court determines in accordance with law that: 
(a) the press or the public should be excluded from all or part of a trial on the basis 
of specific findings announced in open court showing that the interest of private 
lives of the parties or their families or of juveniles so requires; or 
  
                                                          
17 Section 10 of the Madrid Principles. 
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(b) the exclusion is strictly necessary to avoid publicity prejudicial to the fairness of 
the trial or endangering public morals, public order or national security in a 
democratic society.18 
Overall, the Madrid Principles, as read with the Siracusa Principles, may be taken to 
establish a minimum international standard as regards the relationship between freedom of 
expression and the right to a fair trial. 
2.3.2 Summation 
Freedom of expression, including freedom of the press and the freedom to receive and impart 
information, is recognised in international law as essential for a democratic society. Belsey 
argues that only ethical journalism, that is, journalism which exhibits honesty, accuracy, truth, 
objectivity, fairness, balance and respect for the autonomy of ordinary people is part of the 
democratic process.19 Kelly opines that one of the roles of a free press in a democratic society is 
to analyse judicial performance and the exercise of judicial discretion, to be critical where 
appropriate, and to disseminate this analysis.20 
The media have a right to report, therefore, on pending criminal matters and the public 
has a right to receive such information to be able to appreciate and understand the rule of law 
in society.21 This includes coverage by the media of cases before, during and after trial. When 
providing such coverage, however, the media should avoid commentary which threatens 
judicial independence or violates the presumption of innocence. 
Adverse pre-trial publicity or trial by media cannot be considered to be ethical 
journalism in Belsey’s terms, as it challenges not only the independence of the judiciary but also 
could violate the presumption of innocence. In such cases, the information disseminated by the 
media and received by the public cannot be said to serve the values underlying freedom of 
expression. Unfounded criticism of the rule of law may ensue. Freedom of expression for the 
media is extensive but not absolute and therefore may be limited in circumstances where pre-
trial publicity becomes unethical journalism. 
                                                          
18 See also Article 14(1) of the ICCPR. 
19 Belsey (2014: 10). 
20 Kelly (1995: 5). 
21 Kelly (1995: 5). 
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2.4 Rationale of Freedom of Expression 
According to Curry & De Waal, the interpretation of constitutional rights must be generous and 
purposive and must give expression to the underlying principles of the Constitution.22 In 
Shabalala, the Constitutional Court supported this view.23 This approach to interpretation 
requires an assessment of the purpose of freedom of expression to establish whether said 
purpose articulates the underlying principles of the Constitution. Once this is established, the 
limits of the right to freedom of expression will be appreciated.24 The values underlying the 
Constitution are summarised in Shabalala as follows: 
The Constitution is not simply some kind of statutory codification of an acceptable 
or legitimate past. It retains from the past only what is defensible and represents a 
radical and decisive break from that part of the past which is unacceptable. It 
constitutes a decisive break from a culture of apartheid and racism to a 
constitutionally protected culture of openness and democracy and universal human 
rights for South Africans of all ages, classes and colours. There is a stark and 
dramatic contrast between the past in which South Africans were trapped and the 
future on which the Constitution is premised. The past was pervaded by inequality, 
authoritarianism and repression. The aspiration of the future is based on what is 
“justifiable in an open and democratic society based on freedom and equality”. It is 
premised on a legal culture of accountability and transparency.25 
In a word, the Constitution provides the shift away from a past based on conflict, untold 
suffering and injustice to a future which is to be founded on the recognition of human rights.26 
The underlying core values of the Constitution are openness, transparency, 
accountability, democracy and the culture of universal human rights for all South Africans. The 
interpretation of the right to freedom of expression, therefore, must be purposive and should 
give effect to these constitutional values. Expression which does not articulate these values 
should not be protected constitutionally. 
South Africa broke recently with a past where thought control, censorship and enforced 
conformity to governmental theories were the norm. The majority of the citizenry, including 
                                                          
22 Currie & De Waal (2005: 360). See also S v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) 403. 
23 Shabalala and others v Attorney-General, Transvaal, and another 1996 (1) SA 725 (CC) 740. 
24 Currie & De Waal (2005: 360). 
25 Shabalala v Attorney-General, Transvaal 740. 
26 Shabalala v Attorney-General, Transvaal 740. 
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the media, were not allowed a platform for the free and open exchange of ideas. Langa J, in 
Islamic Unity Convention, explains: 
We have recently emerged from a severely restrictive past where expression, 
especially political and artistic expression, was extensively circumscribed by various 
legislative enactments. The restrictions that were placed on expression were not 
only a denial of democracy itself, but also exacerbated the impact of the systemic 
violations of other fundamental human rights in South Africa. Those restrictions 
would be incompatible with South Africa's present commitment to a society based 
on a “constitutionally protected culture of openness and democracy and universal 
human rights for South Africans of all ages, classes and colours”.27 
The media, therefore, play an important role in society. They give effect to the principles of 
openness, transparency and accountability which underlie our Constitution. They keep checks 
on the state and call it to account for its actions or omissions. It is through the media that the 
public is able to hear, form and express opinions on a wide array of matters and in this way a 
platform for the exchange of ideas is created.28 Any restriction upon a free press threatens the 
values underlying the Constitution. 
2.4.1 Freedom of Expression and Democracy 
Our courts consider freedom of expression to be a guarantor of democracy. Thus, in South 
African National Defence Union, the court held that: 
Freedom of expression lies at the heart of a democracy. It is valuable for many 
reasons, including its instrumental function as a guarantor of democracy.29 
In Phillips, the court held that freedom of expression is integral to democracy.30 It is a right 
which promotes accountability, transparency and openness. These are values of a democratic 
state.31 The importance of these values, in relation to the role of the media, is summarised in 
Holomisa: 
In a system of democracy dedicated to openness and accountability the important 
role of the media, both publicly and privately owned, must be recognised. The 
success of our constitutional venture depends upon robust criticism of the exercise 
of power. This requires alert and critical citizens … strong and independent 
                                                          
27 Islamic Unity Convention v Independent Broadcasting Authority & Others 307. 
28 South African National Defence Union v Minister of Defence and another 1999 (4) SA 469 (CC) 477. 
29 South African National Defence Union v Minister of Defence 477. 
30 Phillips and Another v Director of Public Prosecutions, Witwatersrand Local Division and Others 2003 (3) 
SA 345 (CC) 365. 
31 Milo, Penfold & Stein (2013: 23). See also Holomisa v Argus Newspapers Ltd 1996 (2) SA 588 (W) 608-9. 
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newspapers, journals and broadcast media are needed also, if those criticisms are to 
be effectively voiced, and if they are to be informed with the factual content and 
critical perspectives that investigative journalism may provide.32 
In democratic states, governments are accountable to the electorate. Democratic governments 
do not operate behind closed doors. Their actions are transparent and are subject to public 
scrutiny and debate. The media, in this context, become the watchdog of the people, to ensure 
that governments are held accountable for their actions and that they make good their 
undertakings. 
The judiciary is called to account in the same manner. The principle of open justice is 
entrenched firmly in our law and the media, by virtue of the values of transparency and 
accountability, have a right to report on court matters, whether before, during or after the trial, 
thereby monitoring the exercise of judicial power. It is the right of every person to be informed 
about matters before our courts. This view is supported by Mamabolo, in which Kriegler J held 
that: 
It has been accepted that the business of adjudication concerns not only the 
immediate litigants but is a matter of public concern which, for its credibility, is 
done in the open where all can see … vocal public scrutiny performs another 
important constitutional function. It constitutes a democratic check on the Judiciary. 
The Judiciary exercises public power and it is right that there be an appropriate 
check on such power.33 
Van der Westhuizen opines that the legitimacy of the courts is dependent on reports, 
comments and discussion in the media.34 Public understanding of and confidence in the 
judiciary are essential elements of a democracy. Therefore, it is crucial that the media act 
responsibly when covering matters before courts. If they act irresponsibly, the very legitimacy 
of our courts are at risk, because the people may call into question the credibility of the 
judiciary and hence of the administration of justice. 
Van der Westhuizen points out further that the legitimacy not only of our courts but 
also of our constitutional order is dependent on media discussion and debate.35 In other words, 
                                                          
32 Holomisa v Argus Newspapers Ltd 608-9. 
33 S v Mamabolo (E TV and Others Intervening) 2001 (3) SA 409 (CC) 426. 
34 Van der Westhuizen (2008: 268). 
35 Van der Westhuizen (2008: 268). 
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irresponsible, biased and adverse media reporting places the legitimacy of both our courts and 
our constitutional order at risk. 
2.4.2 Truth and the Marketplace of Ideas 
Freedom of expression is important in the search for truth.36 This search is pursued most 
productively in the marketplace of ideas, which essentially means that truth may emerge from 
unrestricted and open discussion and dialogue. In Case, the court supported the idea that “the 
search for truth is best facilitated in a free 'marketplace of ideas’”37 and held that both the 
supply and the demand side of the market should be unrestricted. In other words, both the 
right to impart and the right to receive information and ideas should be unimpeded. This is 
particularly important given the past of South Africa, when the only truth was that of the 
Apartheid government and opinions of people were made to conform to government ideology. 
In this connection, the court in Mamabolo held that:  
Having regard to our recent past of thought control, censorship and enforced 
conformity to governmental theories, freedom of expression - the free and open 
exchange of ideas - is no less important than it is in the United States of America. It 
could actually be contended with much force that the public interest in the open 
market-place of ideas is all the more important to us in this country because our 
democracy is not yet firmly established and must feel its way. Therefore we should 
be particularly astute to outlaw any form of thought control, however respectably 
dressed.38 
The principle is that freedom of expression will promote open and free discussion and debate. 
Whether or not it leads to the truth is not as important as safeguarding this free flow of 
information. The court expounded the principle that all are free to say what they want when 
they want as one which must be protected lest we want to return to the censorship and 
thought control of the past. 
It could be argued that the current protection afforded to freedom of expression by our 
courts and the strict test laid down to limit this right exist because our courts are driven by the 
fear that South Africa may revert to prohibitions of the Apartheid era. It stands to reason, 
                                                          
36 Milo, Penfold & Stein (2013: 17). 
37 Case and Another v Minister of Safety and Security and Others; Curtis v Minister of Safety and Security and 
Others 1996 (3) SA 617 (CC) 630. 
38 S v Mamabolo (E TV and Others Intervening) 429. 
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therefore, that the courts will favour the right to freedom of expression over the right to a fair 
trial. 
2.4.3 Self-fulfilment and Audience Autonomy 
Freedom of expression promotes individual self-fulfilment and personal growth. The free flow 
of information and ideas allows everybody to develop freely their intellect, interests, tastes and 
personality.39 This is articulated clearly in Case, where the court found that: 
Freedom of speech is a sine qua non for every person's right to realise her or his full 
potential as a human being, free of the imposition of heteronomous power … the 
right to receive others' expressions has more than merely instrumental utility, as a 
predicate for the addressee's meaningful exercise of her or his own rights of free 
expression. It is also foundational to each individual's empowerment to 
autonomous self-development.40 
Self-fulfilment is achieved when individuals decide for themselves what is good or bad, without 
intrusion. This encourages the free development of opinions and thoughts on a wide array of 
matters which, in turn, enables self-development and growth. 
In addition, the court in Case declared that freedom of expression, together with 
freedom of conscience, religion, thought, belief and opinion, the right to privacy and the right 
to dignity, strengthens the entitlement to participate in an ongoing process of communicative 
interaction, which has influential and fundamental value.41 This view is supported by South 
African National Defence Union, in which the court emphasised that the ability to form and 
express opinion is important both for a democratic society and for individuals personally, 
irrespective of whether such opinion is formed and expressed individually or in a group and 
even where such opinion is controversial.42 
2.5 Rights and Obligations of the Media 
As noted earlier, freedom of the press is recognised specifically in section 16(1)(a) of the 
Constitution. The media are the bearers of this aspect of the constitutional right to freedom of 
                                                          
39 Gardener v Whitaker 1995 (2) SA 672 (E) 687. 
40 Case v Minister of Safety and Security 630. 
41 Case v Minister of Safety and Security 631. 
42 South African National Defence Union v Minister of Defence 477. 
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expression. Importantly, the right comes with a corresponding constitutional obligation to 
impart news and information to the citizenry. Indeed, in South African Broadcasting 
Corporation Limited v National Director of Public Prosecutions, the court held that freedom of 
expression is not a right of the media to exercise, but a right of every person to hear, form and 
express opinions and views freely on a wide range of matters. It is the duty of the media to 
inform, impart and disseminate information and ideas to every person.43 
The role of the media and their obligations are articulated clearly in the matter of 
Khumalo. The findings of the court may be summarised as follows: 
(a) The media must ensure that every citizen’s right to freedom of the press and 
the media and the right to receive information and ideas are respected. 
(b) They must carry out their mandate in such a manner that will enable every 
citizen to be a responsible and effective member of society. 
(c) The media are important agents in ensuring that government is open, 
responsive and accountable to the people as the founding values of our 
Constitution require. 
(d) They must provide citizens both with information and with a platform for the 
exchange of ideas, which are fundamental to the development of a democratic 
culture. 
(e) The media, as the primary source of information, are powerful institutions and 
they therefore have a constitutional duty to act with vigour, courage, integrity 
and responsibility.44 
The Constitution protects the media in the performance of their obligations to the broader 
society. Media that are independent, responsible, reliable and trustworthy will strengthen our 
democracy and our constitutional order.45 Viewed in this light, any restriction on the media will 
be difficult, if not impossible, to justify. 
Needless to say, adverse pre-trial publicity and trial by media do not suggest media 
responsibility, reliability and integrity, as envisaged by section 16 of the Constitution. When the 
media act unscrupulously, irresponsibly and without integrity, they merely are asserting the 
right to freedom of expression, and are no longer fulfilling their obligations to the broader 
society. Media of this calibre do nothing to promote the values underlying freedom of 
                                                          
43 South African Broadcasting Corporation Limited v National Director of Public Prosecutions 535-536. 
44 Khumalo v Holomisa 417. 
45 Khumalo v Holomisa 417. 
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expression, thereby undermining the administration of justice and jeopardising the 
constitutional order. 
2.6 Trial by Media 
The media are relatively free to report on a wide range of matters without restriction,46 
including pending criminal cases. In the case of Worm it was held that, while courts are the fora 
for pronouncing on guilt or innocence, this does not mean that there can be no prior or 
concurrent discussion of the subject matter of criminal trials elsewhere, whether in specialised 
journals, in the general press or amongst the public at large.47 The problem arises when the 
media pronounce on the guilt of an accused prior to the case being tried in a court of law. Here 
the media, as the primary source of information, dictate and influence public opinion, and lead 
to the accused being tried in the court of public opinion, commonly known as trial by media. 
With the advent of modern technology, society has become media-saturated and the 
potential for adverse pre-trial publicity has increased exponentially.48 Newspapers, facing 
competition from online sources, social media and live blogging, are under increasing pressure 
to cover major crimes and tend to push the boundaries with the content they publish.49 Today's 
media influence and dictate the public’s opinions about criminal cases long before they are 
tried in a court of law.50 Often, the media's influence begins hours after a crime has been 
committed,51 as occurred in the Oscar Pistorius murder case.52 
Was Oscar Pistorius being tried in the court of public opinion? Does this not amount to 
trial by media? Certainly, one cannot deny that the role of the judge in the case was made so 
much harder by the daily barrage of discussion of evidence, strategy and opinions in the media. 
In Harber, Van Dijkhorst J held that even a careful discussion of the outcome of a case may lead 
                                                          
46 See Freedom of Expression Institute (2007: 1). 
47 Worm v Austria 25 EHRR 454 (1998) par 50. See also Mcbride (2009: 180). 
48 Sambrooks (2013: 1). 
49 Sambrooks (2013: 2). 
50 Sambrooks (2013: 2). 
51 Sambrooks (2013: 2). 
52 See Mail & Guardian (13 February 2013); Mail & Guardian (15 February 2013); Mail & Guardian (19 
February 2013); The Independent (19 February 2013); Mail & Guardian (20 February 2013); Mail & 
Guardian (14 February 2013). 
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to trial by media.53 His argument holds water, as many media reports included speculation 
about the guilt or innocence of Pistorius by legal experts. In the circumstances, trial by media 
was unavoidable and, unsurprisingly, both the judgment and the judge were criticised by those 
who believed that Pistorius was guilty of murder. The media were quick to report on these 
criticisms in such pieces as Pistorius judgment not well reasoned,54 Donald Trump slams Oscar 
Judge on Twitter again,55 Not the right judgment — Reeva’s mom56 and Legal experts taken 
aback by Pistorius judgment.57 The media did cover opinions which expressed overwhelming 
support for the judge and the judgment in reports such as Legal organisations condemn attack 
on Masipa58 and COPE slams 'unwarranted' attack on Judge Masipa.59 What is certain, 
however, is that Oscar Pistorius was tried in the court of public opinion. Significantly, in 
Multichoice it was held that only one court would have the duty to pass judgment on Pistorius. 
It was held further that trial by media cannot be in the interests of justice and potentially could 
undermine court proceedings and the administration of justice.60 
However, the problem goes much further than the potential undermining of court 
proceedings. The coverage of high profile criminal cases will perform a useful purpose only if it 
serves democracy. In other words, the public has a right to be informed about the functioning 
of the courts which, in turn, will strengthen their understanding of and confidence in the 
judicial system. The media keep a check on the exercise of public power by the judiciary and 
such media scrutiny will increase the accountability of the judicial process. However, the media 
reports on pending matters invariably speculate on guilt or innocence and rarely cover the 
administration of justice or the exercise of public power by the judiciary. The reports focus on 
the individual charged with the crime. Pre-trial publicity or trial by media therefore is of little 
merit as it serves none of the values underlying freedom of expression. Instead, it threatens the 
                                                          
53 S v Harber; In Re S v Baleka 1986 (4) SA 386 (T) 393. 
54 News 24 (24 October 2014). 
55 Channel 24 (21 October 2014). 
56 SABC News (11 October 2014). 
57 SABC News (12 September 2014). 
58 SABC News (16 September 2014). 
59 SABC News (15 September 2014). 
60 Multichoice (Proprietary) Limited and Others v National Prosecuting Authority and Another, In Re; S v 
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legitimacy of the judiciary and undermines the administration of justice. The dangers of trial by 
media are articulated in Harber: 
Trial by newspaper is intrinsically objectionable as it would lead to disrespect for the 
law. There will always be a section of the mass media that is ill-informed or 
prejudiced and which, regardless of the truth, attempts to sway public opinion to its 
purposes. If the mass media are allowed to usurp the function of the courts and 
judge the issues which are to be tried, not only will unpopular causes not get a fair 
trial, but the public will be led to believe that it is easy to find the truth, viz in the 
popular press, and disrespect for the process of the law could follow. Wild 
speculation in the press about the outcome of a case would tend to lower the 
esteem in which our courts are held. Should the judgment conform to the 
speculation the impression might be created that the Judge was influenced by the 
press. Should the judgment differ from the speculative expectation false hopes will 
have been raised and the public will not accept the correctness of the court's 
finding.61 
The media coverage of the judgment and sentence in the Pistorius murder trial bears testimony 
to the dangers of pre-trial publicity and trial by media, as expressed in Harber. 
The question to be considered next is why the media report only on high profile 
matters? The media do not find it necessary to report on all cases but carefully choose the ones 
that are newsworthy. If the media claim the right to report on criminal matters, then surely all 
matters before courts ought to be covered. The public has a right of access to this information 
to foster greater understanding of and confidence in the judicial system. This, however, is not 
the case in South Africa. As Hopkins notes: 
Oscar Pistorius and Shrien Dewani may be getting the VIP treatment in court, but on 
the ground, hundreds – if not thousands – of ordinary South Africans are fighting for 
their lives in a criminal justice system that is bent at best; or completely broken. No 
lengthy bail hearings or deep analysis of the evidence for them: they languish in jail, 
waiting for justice that never comes.62 
If the true intent of the media is to foster better understanding of the justice system, to 
reinforce public confidence in the administration of justice and to enable the public to call to 
account the judicial exercise of public power, then they should not devote most of their 
coverage to high profile cases. They need to assist in addressing many of the issues raised by 
Hopkins. 
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2.7 Trial by Media and Industrial Journalism 
It is trite that the guilt or innocence of a person ought to be determined by an independent and 
impartial court of law. Trial by media, as defined by Greer & McLaughlin: 
is the market-driven form of multi-dimensional, interactive, populist justice in which 
individuals are exposed, tried, judged and sentenced in the court of public opinion. 
The media usurp the functions of the courts in these cases and will pass judgment in 
articles pertaining to matters before courts of law.63 
The influence of the media is not to be denied. As Swanepoel indicates, the press is a powerful 
medium that has the right to publish information about legal proceedings.64 With the advent of 
social media networks and online news networks, the influence of the media has been 
strengthened considerably. The media now are empowered to perform their constitutional 
obligations. However, there is an inherent danger as well. The Law Commission of India is of the 
view that technological advancement has increased media coverage of crimes, suspects and 
accused to alarming proportions.65 Indeed, such increased publicity may lead to innocents 
being condemned for no reason or to those who are guilty not receiving a fair trial or being 
given a heavier sentence than they deserve.66 The media fail in their constitutional obligations 
when they act in this manner. The mass media can influence negatively the opinion of the 
masses regarding the administration of justice and the legitimacy of the judiciary by usurping 
the functions of the courts when exposing, trying, judging and sentencing people in the court of 
public opinion. 
Trial by media, according to Swanepoel, arises when inflammatory details that would be 
inadmissible as evidence in court become public knowledge before the trial has begun, and 
tabloids are willing to pay witnesses to tell their stories before they have testified even.67 
Sambrooks describes trial by media as: 
The process whereby the media creates a widespread perception of an individual’s 
guilt of a criminal offence by disseminating prejudicial material and due process 
                                                          
63 Greer & McLaughlin (2012: 398). See also Greer & McLaughlin (2011: 278) and Greer & McLaughlin (2012: 
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64 Swanepoel (2006: 4). 
65 Law Commission of India (2006: 11). 
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gives way to moral speculation and a verdict is arrived at in the court of public 
opinion.68 
She considers that pre-trial publicity may expose jurors to prejudicial information which will be 
taken into account in determining an individual’s guilt, thereby rendering the trial unfair.69 
However, it is naïve to think that judges are not exposed likewise to prejudicial information 
which they might take into account, despite the argument that judges are not influenced by 
extraneous matters.70 When the media disrupt a criminal trial in this way, they pervert the 
judicial process and threaten the administration of justice.71 
As noted above, not all criminal trials attract media coverage. The media focus on high 
profile matters, where the accused are famous individuals, such as sports personalities, 
celebrities and political figures, or the crime warrants publicity. In other words, the media cover 
only newsworthy criminal trials, suspects or accused persons. These coverage choices may be 
linked directly to the pecuniary interest that the media have in reporting on high profile 
criminal matters. According to Belsey, the role of the media as distinctive facilitators of the 
democratic process gives way to considerations such as pursuing career and promotion 
opportunities, meeting deadlines, and satisfying pressure from media managers to meet 
growth targets.72 In this way, the search for profit and expansion of media houses distorts the 
role of the media as facilitators of the democratic process. This distortion is aggravated by 
competition amongst media houses to increase audiences, to make greater profit, to obtain 
greater market share and to secure greater global influence.73 Such competitive coverage 
reports on what the “public is interested in” rather than “what is in public interest”.74 Belsey 
describes this as industrial journalism.75 
Greer & McLaughlin provide a reason for this increased coverage of newsworthy 
criminal trials: 
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Proliferating multi-platform news sites that provide networked consumers with an 
abundance of choice are challenging both the relevance and viability of the 
traditional printed press … The result has been intensified pressure on newspapers 
to deliver dramatic “must-have” stories that demonstrate relevance by setting the 
news agenda. It is the press who are forced to take the biggest risks, testing legal, 
cultural and political boundaries in an attempt to deliver profitable print and online 
exclusives.76 
It is clear that the media, therefore, cannot simply disseminate trivial information on matters 
before courts. The public is responsive to headline stories, and in order to make a profit the 
media have to present stories which attract readers and listeners. The media cover high profile 
matters because, unlike the run-of-the-mill criminal cases, these stories mean increased profit 
margins. 
Adverse pre-trial publicity and trial by media arguably amount to industrial journalism, 
for which the primary concern is making profit, increasing audience targets and pursuing global 
expansion of media houses. Belsey argues, correctly, that democracy cannot be served by 
media that tolerate lies, bias, scurrility, obscenity, triviality, distortion and invasion of privacy, 
all of which are characteristics of industrial journalism.77 
2.8 Conclusion 
Pre-trial publicity must be measured against the values underlying freedom of expression. 
Those values include the search for truth, the proper functioning of democracy and individual 
self-fulfilment. Reporting on pending criminal matters gives effect to the principle of open 
justice and allows the public to keep a check on the exercise of public power by the judiciary. In 
this manner, the values underlying freedom of expression are enhanced. 
Adverse pre-trial publicity or trial by media is simply irresponsible behaviour on the part 
of the media, and therefore it cannot be said to enhance any of the values underlying freedom 
of expression. Van der Westhuizen considers that our constitutional right to receive 
information entitles us to expect at least a basic level of accuracy, understanding of the 
relevant issues and procedures, and fairness.78 Belsey is of the view that only ethical journalism, 
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which exhibits honesty, accuracy, truth, objectivity, fairness, balance and respect for the 
autonomy of ordinary people, is part of the democratic process.79 This view is both meritorious 
and defensible. 
Some of the consequences for the victims of trial by media include the destruction of 
private lives and of innocence, and subjection to prolonged, post-trial attack journalism for 
those who are acquitted or no longer prosecuted.80 The values underlying freedom of 
expression never could have been intended to include such consequences. 
Trial by media is tantamount to industrial journalism motivated by profit. The media 
merely assert the right of freedom of expression, but no longer fulfil their obligations to the 
broader society, and do not promote the values underlying freedom of expression. Trial by 
media thus may be equated to irresponsible journalism not worthy of constitutional protection. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The right to a fair trial is a cornerstone of any civilised criminal justice system and it is the 
duty of every presiding officer to ensure that this right is not unjustifiably infringed upon 
during the course of a criminal trial.1 
This chapter deals with the right to a fair trial, in particular the right to be presumed 
innocent and the right to a public trial, before an ordinary court which is independent and 
impartial.2 
In criminal trials, the state must prove the guilt of an accused beyond reasonable doubt. 
The right to be presumed innocent requires this. Judicial officers have to be impartial and 
independent in hearing matters brought before them. The right to a fair trial is threatened if a 
court is not independent, is partial to the case of either party before it, and does not function 
free from interference.3 The question that this chapter seeks to answer is whether adverse pre-
trial publicity renders a trial unfair. In the process, an attempt will be made to determine 
whether such publicity influences or potentially influences the outcome of cases, in other 
words, whether they tend to cause presiding officers to become partisan to the state or the 
defence. 
When a court convicts an accused despite the existence of a reasonable doubt, the 
prosecution is relieved of its duty to prove the guilt of an accused beyond reasonable doubt and 
the right to be presumed innocent and, thus, the right to a fair trial will be infringed. 
3.2 South African Law 
The right to a fair trial is a fundamental right guaranteed by section 35(3) of the Constitution. 
Section 35(3) reads: 
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Every accused person has a right to a fair trial, which includes the right— 
(a) to be informed of the charge with sufficient detail to answer it; 
(b) to have adequate time and facilities to prepare a defense; 
(c) to a public trial before an ordinary court; 
(d) to have their trial begin and conclude without unreasonable delay; 
(e) to be present when being tried; 
(f) to choose, and be represented by, a legal practitioner, and to be informed of this right 
promptly; 
(g) to have a legal practitioner assigned to the accused person by the state and at state 
expense, if substantial injustice would otherwise result, and to be informed of this right 
promptly; 
(h) to be presumed innocent, to remain silent, and not to testify during the proceedings; 
(i) to adduce and challenge evidence; 
(j) not to be compelled to give self-incriminating evidence; 
(k) to be tried in a language that the accused person understands or, if that is not 
practicable, to have the proceedings interpreted in that language; 
(l) not to be convicted for an act or omission that was not an offence under either 
national or international law at the time it was committed or omitted; 
(m) not to be tried for an offence in respect of an act or omission for which that person 
has previously been either acquitted or convicted; 
(n) to the benefit of the least severe of the prescribed punishments if the prescribed 
punishment for the offence has been changed between the time that the offence was 
committed and the time of sentencing; and 
(o) of appeal to, or review by, a higher court. 
As is evident, section 35(3) lists 15 sub-rights as elements of the general right to a fair trial. This 
list sets out the minimum requirements for a fair trial and all criminal trials ought to be 
conducted in such a manner as to give effect to these rights. Section 35(3) is procedural in 
nature, prescribing the manner in which all criminal trials are to be conducted. However, it 
potentially becomes a tick box for criminal courts. In Brown, for example, the court held that 
the applicant did not show that the adverse pre-trial publicity would lead to any trial related 
prejudices.4 The tick box effect of section 35(3) is evident in this judgment, as the court 
required the applicant to show that specific sub-rights were infringed. However, Brown did not 
rely on any of the sub-rights listed in section 35(3), arguing instead that the presiding officer 
would be biased against him due to the adverse pre-trial publicity. In other words, he 
contended that the case against him would be pre-judged. Sadly, the court in Brown concerned 
itself only with the procedural aspects of section 35(3). 
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The manner in which the court in Brown approached section 35(3) reproduced the way 
in which courts approached fair trial rights prior to 1994. Thus, for example, in the 1992 case of 
Rudman, the court held that: 
The entitlement to a fair trial presupposes that it be conducted in accordance with the rules 
and principles in the procedure which the law requires. The enquiry is whether there has 
been an irregularity or illegality, that is, a departure from the formalities, rules and 
principles of procedure according to which our law requires a criminal trial to be initiated or 
conducted.5 
It went on to pronounce that a court of appeal: 
(D)oes not enquire whether the trial was fair in accordance with “notions of basic fairness 
and justice”, or with the “ideas underlying the concept of justice” which are the basis of all 
civilised systems of criminal administration.6 
And with regard to equity in law, the court found that: 
When the question concerns the law as it should be ideally (de lege ferenda), notions of 
basic fairness and justice, of common and fundamental ideas of fairness and right, are of 
course a prime consideration. But where, as now, the enquiry concerns the law as it is (de 
lege lata) this is not so. 
Rudman is representative of the pre-1994 approach. The courts agreed that the right to a fair 
trial concerned only the question of whether there was compliance with the formalities, rules 
and principles of procedure according to which our law requires a criminal trial to be initiated 
or conducted. The focus was upon the law as it is and not upon whether the trial complied with 
with notions of fairness and justice. In other words, there was no serious consideration given to 
equity, of the law as it should be.7 
This is no longer the position in South African law. Already in 1995 the Constitutional 
Court held, in the case of Zuma, that the constitutional right to a fair trial included substantive 
fairness, which requires that all criminal trials be conducted in accordance with the notions of 
basic fairness and justice.8 It added that all courts hearing criminal trials or criminal appeals 
must give content to those notions. Similarly, the court in Bogaards held that: 
                                                          
5 S v Rudman and Another; S v Mthwana 1992 (1) SA 343(A) 299-300. 
6 S v Rudman 299 -300. 
7 S v Rudman 301. 
8 S v Zuma and Others 1995 (4) BCLR 401 (SA) 411. 
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This Court must not merely examine the law as it stands. This is because, as will be 
demonstrated below, the right to a fair trial under the Constitution has a normative 
component which requires courts not merely to follow existing rules of procedure but to 
conduct proceedings in a substantively fair manner.9 
The right to a fair trial, therefore, is not limited to the 15 sub-rights contained in section 35(3).  
Again, in Zuma the court held that: 
The right to a fair trial conferred by section 25(3) [of the 1993 Constitution] is broader 
than the list of specific rights set out in paras (a) to (j) of the subsection. It embraces a 
concept of substantive fairness which is not to be equated with what might have passed 
muster in our criminal courts before the Constitution came into force.10 
Subsequently, the court in Dzukuda held that: 
Elements of this comprehensive right are specified in paras (a) to (o) of ss (3). The words 
“which includes the right” preceding this listing indicate that such specification is not 
exhaustive of what the right to a fair trial comprises. It also does not warrant the 
conclusion that the right to a fair trial consists merely of a number of discrete sub-rights, 
some of which have been specified in the subsection and others not. The right to a fair 
trial is a comprehensive and integrated right, the content of which will be established, on a 
case by case basis, as our constitutional jurisprudence on s 35(3) develops. It is preferable, 
in my view, in order to give proper recognition to the comprehensive and integrated 
nature of the right to a fair trial, to refer to specified and unspecified elements of the right 
to a fair trial, the specified elements being those detailed in ss (3).11 
Therefore, the fact that a court gives effect to all the sub-rights listed in section 35(3) does not 
guarantee or imply that the trial was fair. Also, a case based on an infringement of the right to a 
fair trial need not aver an infringement of any of the sub-rights listed in section 35(3), since the 
right to a fair trial is broader than those sub-rights. The court in Dzukuda held that the norm 
prescribed by section 35(3) is a fair trial.12 This norm, according to Bogaards, prescribes what 
would be expected in a properly conducted criminal trial, which includes the section 35(3) 
procedural safeguards and substantive fairness.13 Any deviation from this norm results in a 
failure of justice and, consequently, in an unfair trial. 
Section 35(3), therefore, has both a procedural and substantive component. The 
procedural component encompasses the list of sub-rights which must be satisfied. The 
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10 S v Zuma 411. 
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12 S v Dzukuda 1261. 
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substantive component requires every criminal trial to be conducted in accordance with the 
notions of basic fairness and justice. In other words, section 35(3) requires consideration both 
of the law as it is, that is, whether the trial was conducted according to the formalities, rules 
and principles of procedure, and the law as it should be, that is, whether the trial accorded with 
notions of basic fairness and justice. 
The issue to be determined here is whether adverse pre-trial publicity or trial by media 
amounts to an “irregularity” which results or could result in a failure of justice. This 
determination needs to be made taking into account both the procedural and substantive 
aspects of the right to a fair trial entrenched in section 35(3) of the Constitution. 
Pre-trial publicity or trial by media occurs primarily at the inception of the criminal 
process, from the time of arrest until the suspect is charged formally and subsequently appears 
in court. Depending on the nature of the crime and the person involved, as highlighted in 
Chapter Two above, it will continue for the duration of the criminal trial. During this period the 
media discuss evidence to be heard by the courts and speculate on the outcome of cases. They 
may project irrelevant and inadmissible evidence as the truth, thereby convincing the people of 
the guilt of the accused. The impact of such media coverage can be dire for an accused. The 
accused faces the reality of a court refusing bail and, as a result, could spend a lengthy period 
incarcerated while awaiting trial. His freedom of movement thus could be curtailed and his 
privacy invaded by media bent on publishing a headline story. 
In the case of Oscar Pistorius, for example, evidence to be used at trial was published 
widely and there was a public clamour for him to be denied bail.14 Protesters, who included 
members of the ANC Women’s League, expressed concern about the level of violence against 
women and called for Pistorius not to be granted bail.15 His legal team discharged the onus of 
showing that he would stand trial, that he was not a flight risk and that there were exceptional 
circumstances. The magistrate did grant Pistorius bail but proceeded to set very stringent bail 
conditions, which conditions the High Court later found to be tantamount to a denial of bail. 
Was the magistrate influenced in his decision by all the protest and calls for Pistorius to be 
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denied bail? It does appear to be the case, as the High Court later relaxed the bail conditions 
and warned that a bail application is not a trial and is not concerned with the innocence or guilt 
of an accused. Bam J dismissed all the reasons given by the magistrate for setting the stringent 
bail conditions, saying that bail conditions cannot be used as a form of anticipatory punishment, 
that all should be treated equally before the law and that an accused is innocent until proved 
guilty.16 
This decision of the High Court is criticised by Magnay, who states that: 
I still can't fathom a judicial system that allows Pistorius, who has admitted to killing his 
girlfriend, Reeva Steenkamp, not once with a stray bullet, but with multiple shots through a 
locked door, to enjoy his freedom. How many other South Africans without the connections, 
money and status of Pistorius enjoy such benefit?17 
She goes on to make the following suggestion: 
Perhaps, ladies, our only hope in the relentless battle to combat violence against women is 
to have a female judge.18 
A female judge indeed was appointed to preside over the trial of Oscar Pistorius. Media 
coverage of the protest outside the court where Pistorius appeared and stories such as 
Magnay’s exemplified the plight of women facing male violence in South Africa. If it is accepted 
that the appointment of a female judge was influenced by the enormous publicity which the 
case of Pistorius attracted, then it goes without saying that adverse pre-trial publicity could 
influence the outcome of criminal cases. 
The trial of Shrien Dewani attracted similar levels of publicity. The ANC Women’s League 
was reported by the media as saying that Shrien Dewani must be extradited from England to 
stand trial in South Africa for the murder of his wife. Its call for his extradition came during 
South Africa’s celebration of the 16 days of activism for no violence against women and 
children. The League was quoted in the media as declaring that: 
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It must be made clear to the international community that South Africa is not a 
slaughterhouse where people can come to our country and commit crimes against women 
or anyone else.19 
Again, a female judge was appointed to hear the matter. 
The Pistorius and Dewani matters are good examples of the effect of pre-trial publicity 
on the administration of justice. The influence of the media in this arena is not to be denied. 
What is more, if the media can have a powerful impact on the pre-trial stage. Imagine the 
media pressure faced by the judges who presided over the trials of Dewani and Pistorius. The 
question is whether such media attention renders the subsequent trial unfair? 
3.3 International Law 
The right to a fair trial is recognised in international law as a fundamental right and is protected 
by various international and regional legal instruments. International law highlights four 
components of the right to a fair trial, namely, equality before the law, the presumption of 
innocence, the right to a public hearing and the right to be heard by an independent, impartial 
and competent tribunal. 
The UDHR enshrines the principles of equality before the law, the presumption of 
innocence and the right to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal 
established by law. In this regard, Article 10 states that: 
Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and 
impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights and obligations and of any criminal 
charge against him. 
And Article 11(1) of the UDHR provides that: 
Everyone charged with a penal offence has the right to be presumed innocent until 
proved guilty according to law in a public trial at which he has had all the guarantees 
necessary for his defence. 
The right to a fair trial is protected similarly by Article 14 of the ICCPR. The relevant 
provisions stipulate that: 
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1. All persons shall be equal before the courts and tribunals. In the determination 
of any criminal charge against him … everyone shall be entitled to a fair and 
public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established 
by law. 
2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall have the right to be presumed 
innocent until proved guilty according to law. 
The ACHPR follows suit, protecting the right to a fair trial in Article 7 as read with Article 26. In 
terms of Article 7(1), “every individual shall have the right to have his cause heard” which 
includes: 
the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty by a competent court or 
tribunal; the right to defence, including the right to be defended by counsel of his 
choice; the right to be tried within a reasonable time by an impartial court or 
tribunal. 
Article 7(1) is supplemented by Article 26 which provides that: 
States parties to the present Charter shall have the duty to guarantee the 
independence of the Courts. 
In addition, in 2003 the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights adopted the 
Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Fair Trial and Legal Assistance in Africa (African 
Principles and Guidelines).20 These Principles and Guidelines elaborate extensively upon Article 
7(1) of the ACHPR and give content to it. It sets out a detailed procedure to ensure the fairness 
of trials. The right to a fair and public hearing is set out in Section A(1), which provides that: 
In the determination of any criminal charge against a person, or of a person’s rights 
and obligations, everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a legally 
constituted competent, independent and impartial judicial body. 
The right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty is contained in Section N(6), which states 
that: 
Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall have the right to be presumed 
innocent until proved guilty according to law. 
These components of the international right to a fair trial are strengthened by minimum 
“guarantees” which represent procedural safeguards to which all courts must adhere. The 
words “all the guarantees necessary” in Article 11(1) of the UDHR, “minimum guarantees” in 
Article 14(3) of the ICCPR and “essential elements” and “include” in the African Principles and 
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Guidelines indicate that the list of guarantees, safeguards or elements of a fair trial is not 
exhaustive. Thus, Paragraph 5 of General Comment 13 of the ICCPR states that the 
requirements of Article 14(3) of the ICCPR are minimum guarantees, the fulfilment of which is 
not always sufficient to ensure the fairness of a trial.21 
The presumption of innocence and the right to a public hearing by an independent and 
impartial court stand apart from the “minimum guarantees”. While the presumption of 
innocence is considered fundamental to the protection of human rights,22 the right to a public 
trial in criminal proceedings serves the general interest in the open administration of justice.23 
The right to an impartial and independent judiciary is considered essential to any fair and just 
legal system.24 These rights are substantive in nature and are essential elements of a fair trial. 
The minimum guarantees or safeguards which follow these fundamental rights are procedural 
in nature. As is the case in South African law, compliance with the procedural safeguards does 
not mean that the trial was fair per se. Even if a violation falls outside these procedural 
safeguards, it still may amount to an infringement of the right to a fair trial. 
International law recognises instances where it will be necessary to exclude the media 
and the public from a trial, an exception which is not found in section 35(3) or in section 16 of 
the South African Constitution. Thus, in terms of Article 14(1) of the ICCPR, the press and the 
public may be excluded from the whole or part of a trial should the court consider that their 
presence would prejudice the interests of justice. Similarly, Article 8(5) of the American 
Convention on Human Rights (ACHR) limits the right to a public hearing insofar as it may be 
necessary to protect the interests of justice. In terms of Article 6(1) of the European Convention 
on Human Rights (ECHR): 
the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of 
morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests 
of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the 
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extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where 
publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 
According to Section A(3)(f) of the African Principles and Guidelines: 
The public and the media may not be excluded from hearings before judicial bodies 
except if it is determined to be 
1. in the interest of justice for the protection of children, witnesses or the identity 
of victims of sexual violence 
2. for reasons of public order or national security in an open and democratic 
society that respects human rights and the rule of law. 
Article 14 of the ICCPR, Article 6(1) of the ECHR, Article 8(5) of the ACHR and Article 7 of 
the ACHPR should be read with the Madrid Principles,25 which allow the media the right to 
comment on cases before, during and after trial, without violating the presumption of 
innocence. However, these principles may be departed from: 
in the interests of the administration of justice to the extent necessary in a democratic society, 
to prevent serious prejudice to an accused and, where necessary, to prevent harm to or 
improper pressure being placed upon a witness, a member of a jury or a victim.26 
The Madrid Principles, in turn, should be read with section 38(a) of the Siracusa Principles 
which provides that: 
the press or the public will be excluded from all or part of a trial on the basis of specific findings, 
announced in open court, showing that the interests of the private lives of the parties or their 
families or of juveniles so require or where the exclusion is strictly necessary to avoid publicity 
prejudicial to the fairness of the trial. 
The Madrid Principles, as read with the Siracusa principles, require the media to respect the 
rights of individuals — specifically the right to a fair trial, privacy and dignity — and the 
independence of the judiciary. Where the media fail in this obligation, the limitation of the right 
to freedom of expression is justified in international law. However, these provisions limit the 
right to a public hearing only insofar as the media are concerned and are not generally an 
exception to the right to a fair trial. 
In addition, Section N(6)(e)(2) of the African Principles and Guidelines provides that: 
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Public officials shall maintain a presumption of innocence. Public officials, including 
prosecutors, may inform the public about criminal investigations or charges, but shall not 
express a view as to the guilt of any suspect. 
It may be concluded that, in cases where the prosecution or any public official does express 
views on the guilt of a suspect, the right to be presumed innocent is violated. 
The media, in their coverage of and reporting on criminal cases, could infringe the right 
of an accused to a fair trial and threaten the administration of justice. Where the interests of 
justice are prejudiced, procedural safeguards in the ICCPR, ACHR, ECHR and the ACHPR allow 
for restrictions to be placed upon the media, including debarment of the media from criminal 
trials and from reporting on them. Thus, protection is afforded both the rights of the accused 
and the proper administration of justice. 
3.4 South African Law versus International Law 
In South African law, there is no hierarchy of the rights contained in section 35(3) of the 
Constitution. All these rights are trial related and procedural and follow generally the outline of 
a criminal trial, starting with the right to be informed about the charges and ending with the 
right of appeal or review. There is no distinction between the presumption of innocence, the 
right to a public hearing and other procedural safeguards. The right to an independent and 
impartial judiciary is not part of the Bill of Rights but is to be found in section 165 of the 
Constitution. 
The procedural and evidentiary nature of fair trial rights in South African law is the 
reason why some commentators argue that section 35(3) only operates within the context of 
the criminal trial itself, and is not applicable from the inception of the criminal process.27 As 
argued below, this narrow interpretation of the right to a fair trial is unsound, and the generous 
and purposive interpretation, which extends the application of the right to the inception of the 
criminal process is preferred and in keeping with the spirit and purport of the Constitution. The 
presumption of innocence is an accepted principle of international law and is a fundamental 
right which should stand apart from what is considered procedural. Similarly, the right to a 
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public trial by an independent, unbiased court should be distinguished from procedural trial 
related safeguards. 
South African law does not afford the same sort of protection as international law to 
those who are subjected to adverse pre-trial publicity or trial by media. South African media are 
allowed absolute freedom to speculate on the guilt or innocence of accused persons. Public 
officials in South Africa, likewise, are allowed to speak their minds and express freely their 
views on the guilt of an accused. As noted in §1.1 above, former Police Commissioner, Beke 
Cele, expressed his view on the certain guilt of Shrien Dewani, openly equating him to a 
“monkey” who believed South Africans were “stupid. Similarly, the former National Director of 
Public Prosecutions, Mensi Similane, was quoted in the media as saying: 
This is purely a criminal matter of somebody who murdered his wife while he should be 
celebrating his honeymoon and the facts here are that the accused, who is sought to be 
extradited, came to the country and committed what is a very heinous crime.28 
These proclamations amounted to publicity which was prejudicial to the fairness of Dewani’s 
trial. The fair administration of justice was infringed upon by the media and the public officials 
involved. The comments by Cele and Similane also contravene Section N(6)(e)(2) of the African 
Principles and Guidelines, in that the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty 
according to law includes an obligation upon public officials to uphold the presumption of 
innocence. Thus, whilst they are allowed to inform the public about criminal investigations or 
charges, they may not express a view as to the guilt of any suspect. 
Dewani’s fear that he would not receive a fair trial should he return to South Africa and 
be prosecuted for the unlawful killing of his wife was justified. No action was taken against the 
media and the courts did not hold them to account for contempt of court. The eventual 
acquittal of Shrien Dewani was met with surprise and the presiding judge was criticised for the 
manner in which she handled the trial and for her treatment of the prosecutor who presented 
the state’s case.29 Was the judge influenced in her decision by the media reports on this matter 
or was this the correct judgment? Whatever the answer, the criticism of the judge was 
inevitable as the case was tried and a guilty verdict was expected in the court of public opinion. 
                                                          
28 The Star (21 February 2011). 
29 Daily Mail (10 December 2014); News 24 (14 December 2014); Toronto Star (9 December 2014). 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za
38 
In South African law too much reliance is placed on the limitations clause in the 
Constitution to restrict the media’s right to freedom of expression and to protect an accused’s 
right to a fair trial. The narrow interpretation given to the operation of the right to a fair trial 
and the strict tests laid down in Brown and Midi Television to determine whether media 
coverage of those matters would render the trials unfair and would prejudice the 
administration of justice do not take the matter any further. Adverse pre-trial publicity is of 
little value, serves none of the values underlying the Constitution and is entertainment for the 
masses. Nevertheless, the courts are likely to protect this free flow of information because of 
the very narrow and restrictive interpretation of the right to a fair trial to which they adhere. 
3.5 The Purpose of the Right to a Fair Trial 
The interpretation of constitutional rights must be generous and purposive, must give 
expression to the underlying principles of the Constitution, and the relevant provisions must be 
construed so as to give effect to the purposes for which they were enacted.30 The right to a fair 
trial thus should be interpreted with a view to operationalising the core constitutional values, 
namely, openness, transparency, accountability, democracy and the culture of universal human 
rights for all South Africans. 
The criminal justice system was a vehicle of the apartheid regime which allowed the 
state extensive scope to investigate, charge and prosecute adversaries of the governing party. 
Those accused of crimes were subjected to long terms of awaiting-trial incarceration, the 
Attorney-General was vested with authority to prevent bail being considered, and prohibitive 
bail conditions were imposed with the intention of invading and criminalising the lives of 
accused persons. The administration of justice often occurred behind closed doors and was not 
particularly transparent. The rights to dignity, equality and liberty hardly were afforded accused 
persons, and the indignities they suffered and the moral harm they endured were immense. 
Section 35 of the Constitution was enacted to address the violations and inequalities of 
the past and to engender confidence in the criminal justice system. Procedural safeguards were 
included in section 35 to ensure the fairness of trials, such as the right to a speedy trial, the 
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right to a public hearing and the right to be presumed innocent. Although not part of the Bill of 
Rights, the right to be tried by an impartial and independent court was enacted to give effect to 
the rights under section 35. The court in Jaipal articulates clearly the importance of the right to 
a fair trial as being: 
essential in a society which recognises the rights to human dignity and to the 
freedom and security of the person, and is based on values such as the 
advancement of human rights and freedoms, the rule of law, democracy and 
openness.31 
The right to a fair trial therefore upholds other constitutional rights, such as the right to 
dignity, liberty and equality. The purpose of the right to a fair trial is to protect the rights 
of accused persons and to ensure that the innocent are not convicted. In Sanderson, the 
court held that: 
In principle, the system aims to punish only those persons whose guilt has been 
established in a fair trial. Prior to a finding on liability, and as part of the fair 
procedure itself, the accused is presumed innocent. He or she is also tried publicly 
so that the trial can be seen to satisfy the substantive requirements of a fair trial.32 
Similarly, in Dzukuda the court held that: 
At the heart of the right to a fair criminal trial and what infuses its purpose is for 
justice to be done and also to be seen to be done … In considering what … lies at the 
heart of a fair trial in the field of criminal justice, one should bear in mind that 
dignity, freedom and equality are the foundational values of our Constitution. An 
important aim of the right to a fair criminal trial is to ensure adequately that 
innocent people are not wrongly convicted, because of the adverse effects which a 
wrong conviction has on the liberty, and dignity (and possibly other) interests of the 
accused.33 
However, the right to a fair trial is not limited to upholding the rights of an accused. The trial 
must be fair overall, as Yacoob J explains in the case of Thebus: 
Although a principal and important consideration in relation to a fair trial is that the 
trial must be fair in relation to the accused, the concept of a fair trial is not limited 
to ensuring fairness for the accused. It is much broader. A court must also ensure 
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that the trial is fair overall, and in that process, balance the interests of the accused 
with that of society at large and the administration of justice.34 
This extended notion of the right to a fair trial is followed by Van der Westhuzien J in the 
case of Jaipal: 
The right of an accused to a fair trial requires fairness to the accused as well as 
fairness to the public as represented by the State. It has to instil confidence in the 
criminal justice system with the public, including those close to the accused, as well 
as those distressed by the audacity and horror of the crime.35 
An individual charged with a criminal offence faces grave social and personal consequences, 
including potential loss of physical liberty, subjection to social stigma and ostracisation from the 
community, as well as other social, psychological and economic harms.36 Those who are victims 
of crime may face the same indignity, social stigma and ostracisation, as is evident from the 
criticism levelled at the woman who accused Jacob Zuma of raping her. She was censured and 
humiliated publicly, and Julius Malema was quoted by the media as saying that she “enjoyed 
it”.37 Until an accused is convicted or acquitted, he or she is presumed innocent. Members of 
the public ought to have confidence in the state representing them. This is the interest sought 
to be protected by the right to a fair trial and is the purpose of its existence, that is, “for justice 
to be done and also to be seen to be done”. 
The media report regularly on criminal matters pending before courts. Such reporting 
accords with their constitutional obligation to keep the public informed of matters before 
courts. In this way there is exchange of ideas and conversations are stimulated, particularly 
around the functioning of the criminal justice system. Adverse pre-trial publicity exacerbates 
the grave consequences for those accused of crime and for those who are victims of crime. 
Confidence in the criminal justice system will be diminished and the right to a fair trial violated 
by reporting which affects negatively the dignity, liberty and equality rights of both accused and 
victims. 
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3.6 The Nature of the Right to a Fair Trial 
The right to a fair trial inscribed in section 35(3) of the Constitution accrues only to an accused 
person, that is, a person who has been charged with a criminal offence. Fair trial rights do not 
accrue to those who have been detained or arrested or who are suspects. Once an arrested or 
detained person is charged with a criminal offence, he or she becomes an accused person who 
then is entitled to protection under section 35(3). 
Given that the formal ambit of the right to a fair trial in section 35(3) literally is very 
narrow and routinely interpreted as such, the courts are reluctant to limit freedom of 
expression. The right to a fair trial ought not to find application solely during the trial phase of a 
criminal matter but should apply from the inception of the criminal process.38 This 
interpretation lends credibility to the purpose of this right. 
Persons are arrestees, detainees or suspects during the investigation phase of a criminal 
matter. They eventually may become accused persons if the evidence against them makes out a 
prima facie case. Prior to becoming accused persons, arrestees and detainees may invoke the 
protection afforded them by section 35(1) and section 35(2) respectively of the Constitution. 
However, a suspect is not afforded similar protection and this suggests that the provisions of 
section 35 are irrelevant in relation to such a person. This position was confirmed in the case of 
Van der Merwe, where the court held there was nothing in the 1993 Constitution which 
obligated the police to warn a suspect of his constitutional rights.39 Similarly, in Ndlovu the 
court held that the provisions in the 1993 Constitution dealing with the rights of accused, 
detained and arrested persons are irrelevant where the person making an incriminating 
statement had not been arrested or detained.40 These cases were followed by the decision in 
Mthethwa, where the court held that: 
(A)t the time he was questioned appellant was neither an arrested nor an accused 
person. In these circumstances, the provisions of s 35 of the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996, which deal with the rights of “everyone 
who is arrested for allegedly committing an offence (s 35(1));” “everyone who is 
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detained” (s 35(2)); and “every accused person” (s 35(3)), are not, in my view, of 
relevance.41 
In all the cases quoted above, the persons approached by the police were not arrested, 
detained or accused but were questioned as possible suspects and, inevitably, they 
incriminated themselves, thereby becoming accused persons. Initially, they were not informed 
of their constitutional rights, but as soon as they implicated themselves they were advised 
accordingly. 
These decisions were founded on the restrictive interpretation of section 35(3) of the 
Constitution and do not sit well with the expansive notion of the right to a fair trial. In this 
regard, the judgments in Sebejan and Orrie are to be preferred as in keeping with the spirit and 
purport of the Constitution. In Sebejan, the court held that: 
If the suspect is deprived of the rights which have been afforded to an arrested 
person then a fair trial is denied the person who was operating within a quicksand 
of deception while making a statement. That pretrial procedure is a determinant of 
trial fairness is implicit in the Constitution and in our common law … The 
requirements of due process extends to the pretrial conduct of law enforcement 
authorities … The constitutional right of an accused person does not only relate to 
fundamental justice and fairness in the procedure and the proceedings at his trial. It 
also includes the right to be treated fairly, constitutionally and lawfully by policing 
authorities and State organs prior to the trial.42 
The learned judge based her finding on the particular vulnerability of a suspect, positing 
that: 
A suspect did not know that he or she was at risk of being charged and had not been 
placed on terms. Such a person was in jeopardy of making an incautious statement 
or committing some incautious act which would subsequently be used at the trial 
against him or her. For an investigating officer to take a statement from a suspect in 
those circumstances without a warning was contrary to the imperatives of the 
Constitution and inimical to fair trial procedure. It amounted to taking advantage of 
the suspect's ignorance.43 
This judgment was followed by the court in Orrie which held that: 
An interpretation of the relevant provisions of section 35 which extends them to 
suspects is, to my mind, in keeping with a purposive approach which has regard to 
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the interests which the rights were intended to protect. Moreover it accords with 
the views expressed by the Constitutional Court in S v Zuma and others that the 
"right to a fair trial" embraces a concept of substantive fairness which is not to be 
equated with what might have passed muster in our criminal courts before the 
Constitution came into force. It was held further in Zuma (supra) that all courts 
hearing criminal matters must give content to the notion of "basic fairness and 
justice”.44 
While the question of whether or not the right to a fair trial extends to a suspect may be a 
debatable, it has been held that as far as arrested and detained persons are concerned, it 
does not relate to the criminal trial only, but includes pre-trial fairness. Thus, in Melani the 
court declared that: 
Sections 25(2) and 25(3) of the [1993] Constitution make it abundantly clear that 
this protection exists from the inception of the criminal process that is on arrest, 
until its culmination up to and during the trial itself. This protection has nothing to 
do with a need to ensure the reliability of evidence adduced at the trial. It has 
everything to do with the need to ensure that an accused is treated fairly in the 
entire criminal process: in the "gatehouses" of the criminal justice system (that is 
the interrogation process), as well as in its "mansions" (the trial court).45 
This finding is in keeping with the purposive and generous interpretation of the fair trial 
rights protected by section 35(3) of the Constitution. 
As a rule, the right to a fair trial will find application only where the object of the 
proceedings is the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused person.46 This 
means that an accused in a bail application does not have a right to a fair trial in terms of 
section 35(3).47 In South African law, it may be accepted that where a person applies to a 
court to be released on bail, such a person is already an accused person charged with a 
criminal offence. To say that this right is not applicable during a bail application is to 
accept that that the accused’s right to a fair trial is suspended during such an application. 
This is an unsound approach. It is trite that the objective of a bail application is to 
determine whether the interests of justice permit the release of the accused pending 
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trial.48 Whereas a bail application is not concerned with the guilt or innocence of an 
accused, one of the factors taken into account concerns the “question of possible guilt 
only to the extent that it may bear on where the interests of justice lie in regard to bail”.49 
When considering whether to release the applicant on bail, the court, therefore, does 
consider evidence to be used at trial, in particular the strength of the prosecution’s case 
and the likelihood of a conviction on the facts placed before it.50 The court considers also 
the nature and gravity of the punishment which is likely to be imposed should the accused 
be convicted of the charges against him or her.51 In addition, section 60(11B)(c) of the 
Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 provides that: 
The record of bail proceedings … shall form part of the record of the trial of the 
accused following upon such proceedings: provided that if the accused elects to 
testify during the course of the bail proceedings the court must inform him or her of 
the fact that anything he or she says, may be used against him of her at his or her 
trial and such evidence becomes admissible in any such proceedings. 
Whatever testimony the applicant/accused provides at the bail hearing may become evidence 
at the subsequent trial. If an applicant/accused admits guilt at his bail application and later 
changes his plea to one of not guilty, it may be a factor which inadvertently could assist the 
state in proving its case against him at the subsequent trial. The fact that an applicant/accused 
is warned by the court of the consequences of testifying about the merits of the case during a 
bail application is not sufficient to safeguard his rights in terms of section 35(3). 
There is no justification, therefore, in South African law to find that an accused in a bail 
application does not have a right to a fair trial in terms of section 35(3), especially when one of 
the factors to be considered relates to his culpability. Canadian law has the following to say 
about the operation of the presumption of innocence, which is part of the right to a fair trial, 
outside the trial context: 
The presumption of innocence is therefore an active principle throughout the 
criminal justice process. The fact that it comes to be applied in its strict evidentiary 
sense at trial pursuant to section 11(d) of the Charter, in no way diminishes the 
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broader principle of fundamental justice. The starting point of any proposed 
deprivation of life, liberty or security of the person of anyone charged with or 
suspected of an offence must be that the person is innocent.52 
This view is supported by South African cases such as Acheson and Crossberg. In Acheson, the 
court held that: 
An accused person cannot be kept in detention pending his trial as a form of 
anticipatory punishment. The presumption of the law is that he is innocent until his 
guilt has been established in court.53 
The court in Crossberg followed the decision in Acheson and held that the “presumption of 
innocence operates in favour of an accused until his guilt has been established in court”.54 
The right to a fair trial ought to commence, therefore, from the inception of the criminal 
process, and bail applications are part of that process. Canadian law offers protection at all 
stages of the criminal process because the right to a fair trial upholds other fundamental rights 
such as the rights to dignity, privacy, liberty and equality. This approach would include those 
who are considered suspects, arrested persons and detained persons, as well as accused 
persons, and is the approach which ought to be followed in South Africa. 
Pre-trial publicity starts within hours of the arrest of suspects and will continue 
throughout the investigation until the accused appears and pleads in a court of law. Adverse 
pre-trial publicity speaks inevitably to the guilt or innocence of those implicated in crime, 
whether they are suspects or detainees or arrested persons or accused persons and where such 
publicity violates the presumption of innocence or influences the outcomes of trials or bail 
applications, the right to a fair trial is infringed. 
3.7 Presumption of Innocence 
The presumption of innocence requires the state to prove the guilt of an accused beyond 
reasonable doubt. According to Schwikkard: 
[T]he presumption of innocence contains two components, 
(a) a rule requiring the state to bear the burden of proof, 
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(b) a directive that the burden will only be discharged when the guilt has been 
proved beyond reasonable doubt.55 
This principle was expounded in the English case of Woolmington in which the court held that 
the golden thread in criminal law is that it is the duty of the prosecution to prove the guilt of 
the accused beyond reasonable doubt.56 It was followed in the cases of Ndhlovu and Zuma, and 
was held to reflect the position in South African law.57 It is for the state to establish the guilt of 
a person and not for the accused to establish his innocence. The presumption of innocence 
operates in favour of the accused and must be rebutted by the state. 
The presumption of innocence operates either as a rule of procedure and evidence 
inside the trial context or as a principle of fundamental justice throughout the criminal process. 
There is much debate in South African law as to whether the presumption of innocence 
operates outside the trial context. Section 35(3)(h) of the Constitution guarantees the right to 
be presumed innocent. Given its enactment as a constitutional right, Schwikkard argues that 
the presumption of innocence does not operate outside the trial context and that it is a rule of 
evidence and procedure in the trial context only. This view is supported by Currie & De Waal 
who opine that the presumption of innocence is a constitutional right that operates only in the 
context of an accused’s right to a fair trial.58 According to De Villiers: 
As the Constitution forms the basis of these rights in contemporary South Africa, the 
effect of the presumption of innocence at trial must be limited to an understanding 
that the presumption is violated if conviction is possible despite the existence of 
reasonable doubt about guilt. This procedural and evidentiary rule only applies at 
trial, where the innocence or guilt of the accused is decided.59 
This argument implies that the presumption of innocence was limited by its enactment as a 
constitutional right and that the common law presumption of innocence no longer exists in 
South African law. It is a rule of evidence and procedure which operates within the trial context 
only. 
                                                          
55 Schwikkard (1998: 396). 
56 Woolmington v DPP (1935) AC 462 (HL). 
57 See Schwikkard (1998: 397); S v Zuma 416; R v Ndhlovu 1945 AD 369. 
58 Curry & De Waal (2005: 748). 
59 De Villiers (2002: 196). 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za
47 
If this approach is followed then it does not matter whether the media speculate on the 
guilt of the accused, no matter how irresponsible and prejudicial such speculation. Thus, trial by 
media is acceptable expression even in a situation where such publicity infringes the 
presumption of innocence, and the trial would not be unfair since the right to be presumed 
innocent operates only as a rule of evidence and procedure during the trial where the object is 
to determine the guilt or innocence of an accused. Anything that happens prior to the trial 
would be irrelevant insofar as the trial itself is concerned.60 This approach is a result of a very 
narrow interpretation of the right to be presumed innocent, and the origin of this narrow 
interpretation lies in the perception that the onus on the state to prove the guilt of an accused 
beyond reasonable doubt is a “mere” rule of evidence applicable during trial proceedings only. 
However, as already noted, constitutional rights ought to be interpreted generously and 
purposively to give expression to the values underlying the Constitution. The purpose of the 
presumption of innocence is described cogently in the Canadian case of Oakes, where the court 
held that the enactment of the presumption as a Charter right does not diminish its broader 
purpose as a fundamental right, which dictates that the starting point of any proposed criminal 
prosecution is that the person charged with or suspected of committing an offence is 
innocent.61 This approach was followed in the South African cases of Sebejan, Orrie and 
Melani.62 The presumption of innocence protects and preserves other fundamental rights and 
to restrict its operation to the criminal trial context will confound its fundamental purpose. 
The right to a fair trial requires, therefore, that an accused be treated fairly throughout 
the criminal process. The right to be presumed innocent under section 35(3)(h) of the 
Constitution ought to apply across the criminal process and thereby become a principle of 
fundamental justice, as applied in international law. The presumption of innocence as a 
principle of fundamental justice requires that any person facing possible criminal prosecution 
be treated as innocent throughout the criminal process. 
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The rationale of the presumption of innocence is set out by Ashworth, whose exposition 
may be summarised as follows: 
(1) To protect the innocent from wrongful conviction. It recognises that public censure of a 
person for criminal conduct and state punishment should not be imposed on the innocent. 
(2) To minimise errors in fact finding during criminal trials. 
(3) To neutralise the disparity between the armoury and resources of the state and that of an 
accused. An accused in a criminal matter comes off second best in this contest but the 
presumption of innocence levels the arena by requiring the state to prove its case beyond 
reasonable doubt. 
(4) Proof beyond reasonable doubt. This rationale for the existence of the presumption of 
innocence serves to reinforce the other three values.63 
Adverse pre-trial publicity or trial by media speaks to the guilt or innocence of an accused. 
Evidence to be used at trial is publicised widely, inviting the public to speculate on the merits of 
the criminal prosecution. Public censure for criminal suspects and for arrested, detained and 
accused persons is exacerbated by such reporting, resulting often in the public calling for 
convictions or acquittals, as the case may be. 
Public censure of crime and of persons accused of committing crime should not be 
imposed on the innocent for, if it is, it infringes their right to dignity and also may affect 
negatively their right to liberty. In Mthimunye, the media reported that the plaintiff had been 
found guilty of sexually harassing a co-worker, which claim was incorrect and the plaintiff was 
awarded damages.64 In Brown, the court found that the media had created the perception that 
there already had been a verdict on the allegations against the accused, but refused the 
accused’s application for a stay of the criminal prosecution. In both cases the individuals were 
subjected to public censure when, in fact, neither had been tried for or convicted of the crimes 
of which they were accused. The bail application of Pistorius is also an example of how pre-trial 
publicity prompted widespread calls for him to be denied bail. The court responded by setting 
stringent bail conditions, which conditions were relaxed by the High Court on appeal. The 
remarks by Bam J, noted in §3.2 above, suggest clearly that the magistrate who presided over 
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the bail application had been influenced in his decision by the adverse pre-trial publicity and 
especially by the public censure of the both the crime committed and of Pistorius himself.65 
It is submitted that the presumption of innocence operates from the inception of the 
criminal process, and from that point the person suspected of committing the crime in question 
is considered innocent. Any pre-trial process which implies that the accused is guilty, including 
any such process influenced by media reports surrounding criminal offences, infringes the 
presumption of innocence.66 Pistorius was treated as if he were guilty of murder, hence the 
stringent bail conditions imposed by the magistrate. That the magistrate had been influenced 
by the adverse pre-trial publicity is implicit in the judgment of Bam J. 
If the result of media coverage of criminal trials leads to widespread censure by the 
public of accused prior to conviction, then the presumption of innocence is violated. If a court 
convicts an accused of a crime despite the existence of reasonable doubt, the presumption of 
innocence likewise is infringed. Media coverage of the murder of the well-known Van Breda 
family in Stellenbosch sparked debate on the guilt of the accused, Henri van Breda. Media 
reports on the evidence to be used by the state against the accused was publicised widely, in 
articles with titles such as Shocking details emerge as State builds case against Henri van Breda, 
The Van Breda murders: Horrific evidence emerges surrounding Henri and Van Breda killings: 
what happened that night.67 These reports describe the evidence to be used at trial and how 
the accused supposedly is linked to the murders. One report goes so far as to suggest that the 
accused faces life imprisonment if convicted.68 Detailed accounts of the circumstances 
surrounding the crime and evidence found at the crime scene are given. Fuelled by media 
coverage, this case is discussed on all social media platforms where the members of the public 
freely pronounce on the guilt of Henri van Breda. There is little doubt that pre-trial publicity 
infringes Henri van Breda’s right to be presumed innocent which led to the state’s and his 
opposing the application by the media to televise the trial. This application by the media to 
broadcast live the trial of van Breda was successful as the court found that the respondents did 
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not show how the fair trial rights of the accused would be compromised by such broadcast.69 
The tick box application of section 35(3) by the court in Brown clearly was followed in this 
instance and, not surprisingly, van Breda and the NDPP are challenging this decision in the 
SCA.70 
Oscar Pistorius, J Arthur Brown and Shrien Dewani, too, were not presumed to be 
innocent, as they were all subjected to scathing pre-trial publicity, each being tried in the court 
of public opinion. Their right to be presumed innocent was denied them by the media and the 
public at large. Their dignity, privacy and, in some cases, their liberty were affected negatively 
by such reporting. Oscar Pistorius was released on bail with very stringent conditions, Brown 
was denied bail and Dewani refused to return to South Africa for fear of facing an unfair trial. 
Pistorius and Brown were convicted but their convictions and sentences were appealed by the 
state largely because of vocal public dissatisfaction. Dewani was acquitted but, again, his 
acquittal was met with hostile media reports which would not accept that he was not guilty. 
3.8 Right to a Public Trial 
The right to a public trial before an ordinary court is guaranteed by section 35(3)(c) of the 
Constitution. It is an accepted principle that a public trial is a trial which is open to the 
public and the media, and on which the media can report. This principle of open justice is 
based on the constitutional values of openness and transparency, which afford the public 
and the media a right of access to the workings of the courts. In South African 
Broadcasting Corporation Ltd, the court held that: 
The principle of open justice is an incident of the values of openness, accountability 
and the rule of law, as well as a core part of the notion of a participatory democracy. 
All these are foundational values entrenched in the Constitution … In the judicial 
sphere, notions of openness are even more important. The public is entitled to have 
access to the courts and to obtain information pertaining to them. There is no 
gainsaying that the gathering of information pertaining to how courts function is 
indivisibly linked to representative democracy. Once more, sections 34 and 35(3)(c) 
of the Constitution require that court proceedings in this country must be “public”. 
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After all, courts of law exercise public and often coercive power. What they do and 
do not do is of legitimate public concern.71 
The court in Mamabolo articulates this principle as follows: 
Judicial proceedings of any significance are conducted in open court, to which 
everybody has free access. All decisions of judicial bodies are as a matter of course 
announced in public; and, as a matter of virtually invariable practice, reasons are 
automatically and publicly given … This manner of conducting the business of the 
courts is intended to enhance public confidence … it has been accepted that the 
business of adjudication concerns not only the immediate litigants but is a matter of 
public concern which, for its credibility, is done in the open where all can see. Of 
course this openness seeks to ensure that the citizenry know what is happening, 
such knowledge in turn being a means towards the next objective: so that the 
people can discuss, endorse, criticise, applaud or castigate the conduct of their 
courts. And, ultimately, such free and frank debate about judicial proceedings serves 
more than one vital public purpose. Self-evidently such informed and vocal public 
scrutiny promotes impartiality, accessibility and effectiveness, three of the 
important aspirational attributes prescribed for the judiciary by the Constitution.72 
It is, therefore, a crucial element of our democracy that the public and the press have free 
access to courts. According to Milo, Penfold & Stein: 
[O]pen justice is a constitutional principle that emerges from the co-incidence of a number 
of rights and values that are entrenched in the Constitution: the right to freedom of 
expression, especially the right of the public to receive information and ideas; the rights to a 
fair criminal trial and public hearing; and the foundational values of accountability, 
responsiveness and openness.73 
The principle of open justice ensures that the exercise of public power by the judiciary is 
scrutinised by the public and the media, and is reported on by the latter. Thereby judicial 
officers are held accountable for any abuse of their powers. 
That justice not only must be done but also must be seen to be done is implicit in the 
principle of open justice, fostering public confidence in the criminal process for both offender 
and victim and thus legitimising the judicial process. As the court in South African Broadcasting 
Corporation Ltd held: 
Open court rooms are likely to limit high-handed behaviour by judicial officers and to 
prevent railroaded justice, to mention two of the risks of secret justice … Far from being 
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intrinsically inimical to a fair trial, open justice is an important part of that right and serves 
as a great bulwark against abuse.74 
Open courtrooms stimulate judicial excellence, thus rendering courts accountable and 
legitimate. 
The right to a public trial is not absolute and may be limited by section 36 of the 
Constitution. Further, section 156 of the Criminal Procedure Act provides for circumstances 
where court proceedings need not be held in an open court. Important for the present 
discussion is section 153(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act, in terms of which: 
[A] criminal court may direct that the public or any class thereof shall not be present 
at such proceedings or any part thereof if it is in the interests of the security of the 
State or of good order or of public morals or of the administration of justice that 
such proceedings be held behind closed doors.75 
In international law, the right to a public hearing and exceptions thereto are provided for in 
several covenants and conventions. Article 14(1) of the ICCPR, Article 6(1) of the ECHR, 
Article 8(5) of the ACHR and Section A(3)(f),(g) and (h) of the African Principles and 
Guidelines, read with Article 7(1) of the ACHPR, entitle everyone to a fair and public 
hearing. In accordance with international law: 
The press and the public may be excluded from all or part of a hearing for reasons of 
public morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, or when the 
interest of the private lives of the parties so requires, or to the extent strictly 
necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would 
prejudice the interests of justice.76 
In terms section 38 of the Siracusa Principles, the media or the public may be excluded from 
court proceedings or part thereof in circumstances where “the exclusion is strictly 
necessary to avoid publicity prejudicial to the fairness of the trial”.77 
As is apparent, both South African law and international law provide for 
circumstances in which the public and the media may be excluded from a public trial in 
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circumstances where publicity would be prejudicial to the fairness of a trial or the interests 
of the administration of justice. This exclusion can be determined only by a court in 
circumstances where it is strictly necessary and in accordance with the law. 
Court proceedings tainted by adverse pre-trial publicity during which the accused 
has been judged and tried in the court of public opinion will encourage a lack of confidence 
in the judicial process, especially when the judgment of the court does not accord with 
what was expected by the public. Justice Chauhan says the following in this regard: 
Most importantly, the appreciation of the evidence by the public and the judiciary 
may differ. While the people are convinced of the guilt of the accused, the court, 
after meticulous examination of the evidence may acquit him. Such differences in 
perception weaken the faith of the public in the criminal justice system.78 
The case of Shrien Dewani is an example of adverse pre-trial publicity creating the impression 
that the accused was guilty of murdering his wife. His eventual acquittal weakened public 
confidence in the administration of justice and tainted the reputation of the judiciary. Traverso 
J, standing firm in her judgment, said the following regarding public opinion: 
I realise that there is a strong public opinion that the accused should be placed on his 
defence. I have taken note of that. I have also taken note of the plight of the Hindochas. I 
have however taken an oath of office to uphold the rule of law and to administer justice 
without fear, favour or prejudice. That I cannot do if I permit public opinion to influence my 
application of the law. If any court permitted public opinion, which has no legal basis, to 
influence their judgments, it will lead to anarchy.79 
Judge Traverso was accused of gross judicial bias and misconduct in the media, with some 
detractors calling for her suspension.80 In another headline story titled Justice failed us, says 
Anni Dewani's family, the ANC Youth League Provincial Chairperson said: 
There was an overriding social interest in the case, particularly given the abuse of 
women and children in South Africa … the ruling set a bad precedent in how the 
justice system dealt with crimes against women and children … Traverso should 
have looked at the entire picture instead of “the non-uniformity” in the state 
witnesses’ evidence … the judgment gave additional credibility to claims that the 
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South African justice system was compromised and easily manipulated by privileged 
persons.81 
Other headlines, such as Judge Traverso wrong to acquit Dewani: Legal expert, Judge Traverso 
must step down: SOPOC, The Dewani trial is a farce and #JusticeForAnni: South Africans criticise 
court for throwing out murder case are all examples of adverse pre-trial publicity which 
convicted Dewani prior to his actual trial and fuelled unfair and unfounded criticisms of Judge 
Traverso.82 The judge explained her decision thoroughly, which ought to have informed the 
public about the applicable laws and how she reached her conclusions. The media, however, 
were not interested in this. They needed to sell a story and the best story in this instance was 
criticism of the presiding judge. 
The principle of open justice strengthens public confidence in the workings of the court 
and enables the public to call to account judicial officers who abuse public power and to debate 
and comment on the administration of justice. Adverse pre-trial publicity and trial by media, as 
they did in the cases of both Dewani and Pistorius, weaken public confidence in the courts and 
the administration of justice. Could it be said that the media reporting in advance of the judicial 
process in Dewani’s case prompted the court to acquit him to retain the integrity of the justice 
system in South Africa or was the judgment correct? This question is the result of continued 
irresponsible and prejudicial pre-trial reporting. Should the media in such cases be excluded 
from a public trial or from reporting on it? 
The right to a public trial has been extended to allow the media live coverage of high 
profile matters. In a landmark decision by the court in Multichoice, the media were allowed 
live coverage of the trial of Pistorius, but in order to balance the right of the media to 
freedom of expression with the right of Pistorius to a fair trial, the court prescribed the 
manner of media coverage.83 Mlambo J made it clear that, when faced with balancing two 
competing constitutional rights: 
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[I]t is not open for me to look at the value of each right and disqualify it in favour of 
another. My task is to look at each right at stake and permit its enjoyment to 
achieve the objective for which it is asserted.84 
Given the adverse pre-trial publicity in the case of Pistorius, it is questionable whether this 
decision was correct. It allowed the media 24-hour coverage of the trial, which included 
panel discussions by lawyers, academics and retired judges. These discussions centred 
ultimately around the possible outcome of the matter. It facilitated trial by media, which 
the court in Mulitichoice had warned against. The public believed not only that Pistorius 
was guilty of murder but also that a lengthy prison sentence would be imposed upon 
conviction. When Pistorius was convicted of culpable homicide and sentenced to a short 
term of imprisonment only, the public was outraged. Prompted by the public outrage and a 
vocal media, the state appealed the culpable homicide conviction, which was overturned 
and Pistorius was convicted of murder. However, the new sentence for the murder 
conviction attracted further outrage and dissatisfaction, and the state once again appealed, 
this time against the sentence imposed on Pistorius. The judges may be swayed by media 
pressure and public opinion, which could lead to a higher sentence for Pistorius.85 
The right of the media to report on criminal trials and the right of the public to receive 
such information and participate in the conversation serves the underlying constitutional values 
of transparency, openness and accountability. Access to courts by the public and the media 
serves the same values. It is, therefore, of the utmost importance that the reporting of cases, 
be it before, during or after trial, not infringe upon the fair trial rights of the accused or upon 
the administration of justice. Adverse media reporting will undermine the entire criminal 
process, as the court in Mamabolo warns: 
This manner of conducting the business of the courts is intended to enhance public 
confidence. In the final analysis it is the people who have to believe in the integrity 
of their judges. Without such trust, the judiciary cannot function properly; and 
where the judiciary cannot function properly the rule of law must die.86 
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The purpose of the right to a public trial and, consequently, the principle of open justice are 
frustrated by adverse pre-trial reporting or trial by media. The problem is aggravated by live 
media recordings of high profile criminal matters which seek not to educate the public but 
to speculate on the guilt of an accused facing the armoury of the state, public censure and 
subjection to social stigma and ostracisation from the community. Such manner of 
reporting will destroy public confidence in the courts, the judiciary and the administration 
of justice. The right to a fair trial encompasses more than just the rights of an accused; it 
involves fairness of the entire process. Where adverse pre-trial publicity is prejudicial to the 
administration of justice the right to a fair trial likewise is infringed. 
3.9 Right to a Trial before an Impartial and Independent Court 
The independence of the judiciary is a prerequisite for the rule of law and a fundamental 
guarantee of a fair trial.87 Notably, though, the right to be tried by an independent and 
impartial court is not part of the fair trial rights contained in section 35(3) of the 
Constitution. This is because the rights in the Bill of Rights are not absolute and may be 
limited in terms of the limitations clause in section 36, whereas the independence and 
impartiality of the judiciary never can be limited. This aspect of the right to a fair trial must 
be read with the provisions of section 165 of the Constitution, which confirm that every 
accused has a right to a public trial by an ordinary court that is independent and impartial. 
Section 165(1) of the Constitution vests judicial authority in the courts. Courts are 
the fora for pronouncing on a person's guilt or innocence on a criminal charge in a public 
hearing. Section 165(2) declares courts to be independent and subject only to the 
Constitution and the law which they must apply impartially and without fear, favour or 
prejudice. In the execution of their duties, judicial officers must demonstrate independence 
in all matters before them. Section 165(3) prohibits any person or organ of state from 
interfering with the functioning of the court, which includes judicial independence. This 
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principle of judicial independence requires that judicial officers decide matters before them 
free from inducements or pressures.88 
The judiciary must display impartiality in all matters before them. The principle of 
impartiality requires judicial officers not to allow their judgment to be influenced by 
personal bias or prejudice, not to harbour preconceptions about a particular case before 
them, and not to act in ways that improperly promote the interests of one of the parties to 
the detriment of the other.89 
The right to a trial before an independent and impartial court is entrenched in 
international law. In terms of Article 10 of the UDHR, Article 14(1) of the ICCPR, Article 6(1) 
of the ECHR and Article 8(1) of the ACHR, everyone has the right to a fair hearing by a 
competent, independent and impartial tribunal. Paragraph 19 of General Comment 32 of 
the ICCPR declares the right to a competent, independent and impartial tribunal an 
absolute right that is not subject to any exception. The principles of judicial independence 
and impartiality are entrenched also in African fair trial rights jurisprudence. Section A(4)(f) 
and Section A(5)(a) of the African Principles and Guidelines, firstly, prohibit any 
inappropriate or unwarranted interference with the judicial process and, secondly, require 
that a judicial body base its decision only on objective evidence, arguments and facts 
presented before it and to decide matters without any restrictions, improper influence, 
inducements, pressure, threats or interference, direct or indirect, from any quarter or for 
any reason. 
In addition, the United Nations Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary 
(UN Basic Principles), adopted by the UN in 1985, are intended to establish standards for 
ethical conduct by judges and to afford the judiciary a framework for regulating its conduct. 
The requisite of independence of the judiciary is set out in the first of the UN Basic 
Principles: 
A judge shall exercise the judicial function independently on the basis of the judge’s 
assessment of the facts and in accordance with a conscientious understanding of 
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the law, free of any extraneous influences, inducements, pressures, threats or 
interference, direct or indirect, from any quarter or for any reason. 
Independence in this instance speaks to the autonomy of a given judge or tribunal to decide 
cases by applying the law to the facts. Judges must be free to decide matters before them 
without interference from other state organs and they cannot be subordinate to the other 
branches of public power. An independent judiciary not only must be independent of these 
and other influences, but also must appear to be independent. In terms of the International 
Principles on the Independence and Accountability of Judges, Lawyers and Prosecutors, 
every state has a duty to: 
Put in place the necessary safeguards so that judges can decide cases in an 
independent manner. The independence of the judiciary must be upheld by 
refraining from interfering in its work and by complying with its rulings. The judiciary 
must be independent as an institution and individual judges must enjoy personal 
independence within the judiciary and in relation to other institutions.90 
No person, therefore, may interfere with or influence the outcome of cases before courts. 
There is an obligation on the state to ensure that the judiciary fulfils its functions free from 
such interference or inducements. 
The impartiality required of the judiciary is set out in the second of the UN Basic 
Principles: 
Impartiality is essential to the proper discharge of the judicial office. It applies not 
only to the decision itself but also to the process by which the decision is made. This 
principle requires a judge to perform his or her judicial duties without favour, bias 
or prejudice. 
Impartiality refers to the state of mind of a judge or tribunal towards a case and the parties 
to it, and requires judges not to harbour preconceptions about the matters brought before 
them, nor to act in ways that promote the interests of one of the parties.91 Impartiality is 
the absence of bias, hostility or sympathy towards either of the parties. Judges are required 
to decide cases only on the basis of facts and in accordance with the law, without 
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restriction. They cannot hold any preconceived notions or ideas of cases before them and 
they cannot become partisan to the cause of either of the parties. It is important that the 
state and all other institutions, private or otherwise, refrain from putting pressure on or 
inducing judges to rule in a certain way, and judges have a correlative duty not to be 
influenced in any way by extraneous matters and to maintain their impartially. 
Trial by media usurps the functions of the courts by pronouncing on the guilt of an 
accused prior to a court of law, in which judicial authority is vested, doing so. Evidence to 
be used at the trial is published in all tabloids and is discussed widely on all fora. In the 
Pistorius matter, discussions were held on every trial day and televised worldwide. Where 
the media publish reports on matters still to be decided by courts, including evidence to be 
presented and the likely outcome of the cases, they are interfering with the functions of the 
judiciary. Such discussion and debate do not circumvent judges and may exert pressure on 
them to decide a matter in a certain way. The task of adjudication is not an easy one and is 
made all the more difficult by pre-trial publicity. Where pre-trial publicity or trial by media 
interferes with or disrupts the functions and duties of the judiciary in this manner, section 
165 of the Constitution is violated. The view of the court in Brown that, due to their training 
and their office, judges are not influenced by extraneous matters and therefore will decide 
cases only on the facts before them cannot be supported.92 
It is trite that judges must be independent and impartial by virtue of the office that 
they hold. However, this does not mean that judges are immune to outside influences. 
According to Ahmad: 
Stir caused by media does not leave the judges untouched. Undoubtedly, judges are 
human beings and the pressure created by the media too influences them.93 
Cardozo, in his lecture on the Nature of the Judicial Process, refers to the forces which 
enter into the conclusions of judges and observes that “the great tides and currents which 
engulf the rest of men, do not turn aside in their curse and pass the Judges by”.94 It is 
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incorrect to believe that judges are not influenced by media reports on matters before 
them. Such influences may not be conscious, as Cardozo explains further: 
Even these forces are seldom fully in consciousness. They lie so near the surface, 
however, that their existence and influence are not likely to be disclaimed. But the 
subject is not exhausted with the recognition of their power. Deep below 
consciousness are other forces, the likes and the dislikes, the predilections and the 
prejudices, the complex of instincts and emotions and habits and convictions, which 
make the man, whether he be litigant or judge.95 
According to Cardozo, there is a measure of resistance or refusal to accept that judges, too, 
are influenced by external forces which manifest in their judgments: 
There has been a certain lack of candour in much of the discussion of the theme, or 
rather perhaps in the refusal to discuss it, as if judges must lose respect and 
confidence by the reminder that they are subject to human limitations. I do not 
doubt the grandeur of the conception which lifts them into the realm of pure 
reason, above and beyond the sweep of perturbing and deflecting forces. None the 
less, if there is anything of reality in my analysis of the judicial process, they do not 
stand aloof on these chill and distant heights; and we shall not help the cause of 
truth by acting and speaking as if they do.96 
In concurrence with these views, Justice Frankfurter held in John D Pennekamp v State of 
Florida that: 
No Judge fit to be one is likely to be influenced consciously, except by what he sees 
or hears in Court and by what is judicially appropriate for his deliberations. 
However, Judges are also human and we know better than did our forbears how 
powerful is the pull of the unconscious and how treacherous the rational process … 
and since Judges, however stalwart, are human, the delicate task of administering 
justice ought not to be made unduly difficult by irresponsible print … It is a condition 
of that function – indispensable in a free society – that in a particular controversy 
pending before a court and awaiting judgment, human beings, however strong, 
should not be torn from their moorings of impartiality by the undertone of 
extraneous influence.97 
Lord Dilhorne, in the matter of Attorney General v BBC, had the following to say about the 
influence of the trial publicity on judges: 
It is sometimes asserted that no Judge will be influenced in his Judgment by 
anything said by the media and consequently that the need to prevent the 
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publication of matter prejudicial to the hearing of a case only exists where the 
decision rests with laymen. This claim to judicial superiority over human frailty is one 
that I find some difficulty in accepting. Every holder of a Judicial Office does his 
utmost not to let his mind be affected by what he has seen or heard or read outside 
the Court and he will not knowingly let himself be influenced in any way by the 
media, nor in my view will any layman experienced in the discharge of Judicial 
duties. Nevertheless, it should, I think, be recognised that a man may not be able to 
put that which he has seen, heard or read entirely out of his mind and that he may 
be subconsciously affected by it.98 
Similarly, in Rex v Parke Wills J held that: 
I think it is a fallacy to say or to assume that the presiding judge is a person who 
cannot be affected by outside information. He is a human being, and while I do not 
suggest that it is likely that any judge, as the result of information which had been 
improperly conveyed to him, would give a decision which otherwise he would not 
have given, it is embarrassing to a judge that he should be informed of matters 
which he would much rather not hear and which make it much more difficult for 
him to do his duty.99 
The task of judicial officers is not an easy one. It requires judges to apply their knowledge, 
experience and expertise to matters before them. This task is made all the more difficult by 
pre-trial publicity. Cardozo, Frankfurter, Dilhorne and Wills were all respected judges and 
even they admit that such publicity can influence them in adjudicating matters, albeit 
subconsciously. 
Adverse pre-trial publicity can influence unduly and induce judges to decide cases in 
a certain way or to be partisan to the cause of a particular party. This kind of influence on 
presiding officers was evident in the bail hearing of Oscar Pistorius. Traverso J, in her 
judgment in the Dewani case, admits that she took note of the strong public opinion that 
the accused (Dewani) should be placed on his defence and of the plight of the Hindochas. 
Why was this necessary if she was going to decide the matter free from such inducements 
or pressures? The effect of pre-trial publicity on the trial of Dewani is evident from these 
concessions by the judge. Her alleged hostility towards the prosecutor was reported by the 
media as another factor leaning towards her being partisan to the cause of the accused. It 
bears noting here that former Constitutional Court Judge Yacoob, commenting on the 
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judgment in the Jacob Zuma rape trial, accepted that judges were human and that their 
decisions were subjective to some extent.100 
The independence and impartiality of judges are violated by adverse pre-trial 
publicity or trial by media. Where judges are influenced in this manner and accused persons 
are convicted despite the existence of reasonable doubt, the right to a fair trial has been 
infringed. In this way judges succumb to public opinion and their judgments will be aligned 
to what the public expects and no longer based on the facts before them. Where the state 
fails to protect the judiciary in the performance of its duties, section 165 of the Constitution 
is violated. 
3.10 Conclusion 
The values underlying the right to a fair trial are dignity, liberty and equality. Subjection to 
public censure and ostracisation from the community count among the indignities suffered by 
those who are accused of committing crime. These are exacerbated by the media reporting on 
matters before court and delivering a villain to the community. The right to a fair trial is much 
more than mere rights afforded an accused person during a criminal trial. It has to protect an 
accused person from the very inception of the criminal process and the values underlying the 
right to a fair trial have to be guaranteed those facing criminal prosecution and those who are 
victims of crime. Any action which infringes the underlying values of the right to fair trial 
renders a trial unfair. 
It may be accepted that trial by media will prejudice the fair trial rights of accused 
persons and the administration of justice. The question in South African law is whether such 
publicity will render a criminal trial unfair. Pistorius, Brown and Dewani all were subjected to 
pre-trial publicity or trial by media. Such media coverage infringes the presumption of 
innocence, frustrates the right to be tried in open court, and interferes with the independence 
and the impartiality of presiding officers. It is publicity which is not meant to educate or inform 
the public on matters before court. Instead, it is publicity motivated by a more sinister design 
and that is financial and market gain for media houses, irrespective of the way it affects the 
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dignity and liberty of an individual. The constitutional right to a fair trial, which was denied so 
many people in the past, ought not to be undermined by media that are intent on publishing 
stories for entertainment purposes. 
The courts in South Africa are reluctant to accept that they are influenced by pre-trial 
publicity. However, this argument is refuted by experienced members of the judiciary who 
admit that judges, being human, are influenced by external factors. There is, therefore, a real 
possibility that an accused may be convicted despite the existence of reasonable doubt. Where 
this happens the right to a fair trial is violated. It is necessary, therefore, for the state to fulfil its 
obligation under section 165 of the Constitution to protect the judiciary in the performance of 
its duties and to prosecute the media who interfere with and unduly influence judges in 
deciding matters. 
 
 
 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za
64 
CHAPTER FOUR 
 
STAY OF CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Media reporting of a judicial process, or in advance of it, may, in exceptional 
circumstances, be so irresponsible and prejudicial as to make the unfairness 
irreparable and the administration of justice impossible. If that were to occur then 
there is, quite literally, nowhere to go. The court will have no option but to grant a 
stay of proceedings.1 
This chapter will deal with the stay of criminal proceedings as a possible recourse for 
those subjected to adverse pre-trial publicity or trial by media. 
It is trite that the right to prosecute vests in the state. As a rule, no person can 
interfere with a decision of the state to institute criminal prosecution. When a court 
grants a permanent stay of criminal prosecution barring the state from prosecuting an 
accused, it effectively violates the right of the state to prosecute. This chapter will 
consider whether adverse pre-trial publicity or trial by media warrants court interference 
with the decision of the state to prosecute. In so doing, the matters of Brown and Banana 
will be analysed critically. 
4.2 South African Law 
An application for the stay of criminal prosecution is an interlocutory proceeding. Such 
applications are brought prior to the start of criminal proceedings or during the trial but before 
its conclusion. However, South African courts are loath to deal with appeals and interlocutory 
applications before a criminal trial is concluded. In Broome, the court held: 
As a general rule, criminal trials should be continuous, with no appeals or 
interlocutory approaches to a court of appeal before conviction. History and 
experience have taught that in general it is in the interest of justice that an appeal 
awaits the completion of a case, as the resort to a higher court during proceedings 
can result in delay, fragmentation of the process, determination of issues based on 
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an inadequate record and the expenditure of time and effort on issues which may 
not have arisen, had the process been left to run its ordinary course.2 
The reasoning of the court is based on the fact that it is easier to determine a violation of a 
right or to correct a wrong decision made during a criminal trial after the trial has been 
completed than during its course. It is difficult to determine issues that have not arisen yet and 
any alleged infringement of the right to a fair trial at this juncture would be nothing more than 
conjecture. However, the court in Broome qualified this approach in finding that: 
Section 39(2) of the Constitution … enjoins this court and imposes an obligation to 
construe that a judicial pronouncement in any criminal proceedings may be subject to an 
appeal, even before plea, where the interest of justice so requires.3 
Thus, an application for the stay of prosecution prior to the commencement of a criminal trial 
will be considered only if it is in the interests of justice to do so. In De Vos, the Constitutional 
Court held similarly that while it generally is undesirable to decide on constitutional issues 
before the conclusion of the relevant proceedings in the lower courts, this rule is not inflexible 
and may be departed from in the interests of justice.4 In terms of the decision of Brown: “Either 
party may apply to the court for a stay in the proceedings. This stay in proceedings may be on a 
temporary or permanent basis.”5 
The stay of criminal proceedings is a drastic remedy which, if granted, could have far-
reaching effects. In Broome, the court describes aptly the nature of such a remedy: 
The relief sought by them is, both philosophically and socio-politically, radical. To 
bar the prosecution before the trial begins is far-reaching. It indeed prevents the 
prosecution from presenting society's complaints against an alleged transgressor of 
society's rules of conduct. That will seldom be warranted in the absence of 
significant prejudice to the accused.6 
The court in Sanderson held similarly that the remedies sought in such cases are radical in that 
they bar the state from prosecuting an alleged offender and seldom will be granted in the 
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absence of significant prejudice to an accused.7 Where a court bars the prosecution on an 
arbitrary basis from instituting criminal proceedings against an alleged perpetrator, it infringes 
section 179 of the Constitution. Section 179 vests the right to prosecute in the National 
Prosecuting Authority (NPA). No one may intervene in or interfere with the decision of the NPA 
to institute a criminal prosecution. An application for the stay of prosecution prior to or during 
a criminal trial will be considered only where it is in the interests of justice to do so and where 
the continuation of the trial would lead to substantial irreparable prejudice to an accused 
person. 
As to what would constitute substantial irreparable prejudice, the court in Brown held 
that: 
The party applying for the stay in the proceedings will have to prove that the stay in 
proceeding is the viable option. The appellants or the accused must satisfy the court 
of the facts upon which they rely for the contention that the right to a fair trial has 
been infringed. If the prejudice is said to not be trial related then there are other 
remedies that one could use that would be less radical than the stay in proceedings. 
The accused ought not to apply for a stay in prosecution on the ground that he or 
she is likely to be prejudiced by external factors, the party must prove that there is 
irreparable trial related prejudice and that the extraordinary circumstances will 
justify such a drastic relief.8 
The court in Broome held also that: “A bar is likely to be available only in a narrow range of 
circumstances, for example, where it is established that the accused has probably suffered 
irreparable trial related prejudice.”9 The court found further that where the prejudice is non-
trial related there are other less drastic remedies available: 
These may include a mandamus requiring the prosecution to commence the case, 
refusal to grant the prosecution a remand, or damages after an acquittal arising 
out of the prejudice suffered by the accused.10 
The court in Sanderson held similarly that where the prejudice is not trial related, other relief is 
possible: 
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Release from custody is appropriate relief for an awaiting-trial prisoner who has 
been held too long; a refusal of a postponement is appropriate relief for a person 
who wishes to bring matters to a head to avoid remaining under a cloud; a stay of 
prosecution is appropriate relief where there is a trial prejudice.11 
The courts are clear, therefore, on the approach to be followed in these matters. Where the 
prejudice to an accused is non-trial related then a permanent stay of prosecution is not an 
appropriate remedy. Where the prejudice is trial related, it must result in irreparable prejudice. 
However, unlike the decisions in Brown and Broome, the court in Sanderson did not rule out the 
possibility that a stay of criminal prosecution may be granted where the prejudice is non-trial 
related.12 This approach is in keeping with the decision in Zuma, in which the court found that 
the right to a fair trial is not limited to the specific rights enumerated under section 35(3) of the 
Constitution but embraced the concept of substantive fairness which enjoins all courts to 
conduct criminal trials in accordance with open-ended notions of basic fairness and justice.13 
The court in Sanderson found correctly that the right to a fair trial extends to both trial related 
and non-trial related prejudice.14 
The non-trial related prejudice that may be suffered by accused persons and the victims 
of crime can be far reaching. The court in Phillips describes the effect of criminal proceedings 
upon an accused in the following terms: 
[D]oubt would have been sown in the eyes of family, friends and colleagues as to 
the accused's integrity and conduct. In addition to social prejudice, an accused is 
subject to invasions of liberty that range from incarceration to onerous bail 
conditions to repeated attendance at remote courts for formal remands.15 
Adverse pre-trial publicity or trial by media exacerbates the grave consequences for those 
accused of crime. In Chapter Three above a determination was made that adverse pre-trial 
publicity violates the right of the accused to be presumed innocent. Such media attention 
perverts the principle of open justice and affects the impartiality and independence of the 
courts. These constitute trial related prejudice. The consequences suffered by an accused 
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person often violate his rights to dignity, liberty and equality. These are the self-same interests 
sought to be protected by the right to a fair trial and require the courts to apply the principles 
enunciated in Sanderson in a proper manner. The distinction made between trial related and 
non-trial related prejudice therefore is unsustainable. 
In sum, South African courts will order a stay of prosecution only in circumstances 
where the trial related or non-trial related prejudice facing the accused is irreparable and there 
are no less drastic remedies available to forestall such prejudice. 
4.3 Foreign Law 
The position in England is similar to the position in South African law. Under English law the 
prosecution decides whether or not to commence criminal proceedings and, if commenced, 
whether they should continue. English courts will not interfere easily in prosecutorial decisions 
in this regard. Thus, in Environment Agency v Stanford, the court held that: 
The jurisdiction to stay, as has been repeatedly explained, is one to be exercised 
with the greatest caution ... The question of whether or not to prosecute is for the 
prosecutor.16 
English courts, by virtue of their inherent jurisdiction to promote justice and to prevent 
injustice, will grant a stay of criminal prosecution where they are of the opinion that to allow 
the prosecution to continue would amount to an abuse of the process of the court. 
An abuse of process was defined by the Privy Council in Hui Chi-Ming v R, “as something 
so unfair and wrong about the prosecution that the court should not allow a prosecutor to 
proceed with the case”.17 A stay of criminal prosecution will be granted only in exceptional 
circumstances where there is an abuse of the court process, and in the absence of any less 
radical remedy. An abuse of process justifying the stay of a prosecution could arise where it 
would be impossible to give the accused a fair trial or where it would amount to a misuse of 
process because it offends the court's sense of justice and propriety to be asked to try the 
                                                          
16 Environment Agency v Stanford [1998] COD 373. 
17 Hui Chi-Ming v R 1992 All ER 3 897. See also Seetahal (2014: 16) and Young (2010: 5). 
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accused in the circumstances.18 However, courts in England prefer for cases to continue to trial 
and to consider first remedies other than a stay. 
Abuse of process is central to the stay of criminal proceedings in Canadian Law. In the 
matter of Scott, the court held that: 
[A]buse of process may be established where: (1) the proceedings are oppressive or 
vexatious; and, (2) violate the fundamental principles of justice underlying the 
community’s sense of fair play and decency. The concepts of oppressiveness and 
vexatiousness underline the interest of the accused in a fair trial. But the doctrine 
evokes as well the public interest in a fair and just trial process and the proper 
administration of justice.19 
Abuse of process concerns the conduct of the prosecution and other authorities when 
instituting criminal proceedings or their conduct during such proceedings. The abuse of process 
must cause actual prejudice of such a degree that the public’s sense of decency and fairness is 
affected.20 Even where there is an abuse of process as described, Canadian courts will not grant 
an application for stay of proceedings easily, as it is considered a drastic remedy. Courts will 
attempt to find less drastic remedies. In Regan, the court held that: 
[S]tay is reserved for only those cases of abuse where a very high threshold is met: 
the threshold for obtaining a stay of proceedings remains, under the Charter as 
under the common law doctrine of abuse of process, the ‘clearest of cases’21 
The court also found further that a stay of criminal proceedings will be appropriate only if two 
criteria are met: 
(1) the prejudice caused by the abuse in question will be manifested, perpetuated 
or aggravated through the conduct of the trial, or by its outcome; and 
(2) no other remedy is reasonably capable of removing that prejudice.22 
To be successful with an application for stay of criminal proceedings under Canadian law, 
the applicant will have to show an abuse of process which caused actual prejudice and 
that such prejudice will be aggravated should the trial continue. Once that has been 
                                                          
18  R v Horseferry Road Magistrates’ Court, ex parte Bennett [1994] 1 AC 42, HL. 
19 R v Scott [1990] 3 SCR 979 1007. 
20 Blencoe v British Columbia (Human Rights Commission) [2000] 2 SCR 307, 2000 SCC 44 par 133. 
21 R v Regan 2002 SCC 12 para 53. 
22 R v Regan para 54. 
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established, there should be no other remedy available capable of removing that 
prejudice. 
The leading authority under Zimbabwean law is the case of Banana. Here the court held 
that: 
[A]n accused person who seeks an order prohibiting his prosecution on the ground 
that circumstances have occurred which would render it unfair (which include 
pretrial publicity), must establish on a balance of probability that there is a real or 
substantial risk that by reason of such circumstances he could not obtain a fair 
trial.23 
In terms of the judgment, a real or substantial risk is not based entirely on the ability of 
assessors or judges to accomplish their task but on the availability of inbuilt mechanisms in the 
criminal justice system to protect the fairness of the trial. According to the court: 
Only when such measures are inadequate to guarantee impartiality and to rid the 
influence of prejudice, will section 18(2) of the Constitution have been breached and 
the benefit of the fair trial process lost to the accused.24 
It may be concluded that a stay of criminal proceedings will be granted only as a last resort, 
when all measures put in place to protect the fairness of a trial fail. The case of Banana is 
considered in more detail below. 
In sum, adverse pre-trial publicity is a ground upon which an order for a stay of criminal 
prosecution may be sought. The court will have to be satisfied that it will be in the interests of 
justice to hear such an application and that the accused will suffer substantial prejudice, 
whether trial related or non-trial related, should the matter proceed to trial. The prejudice 
suffered as a result of such publicity must be irreparable and not capable of being remedied by 
a less drastic recourse. 
4.4 The Cases of Brown and Banana 
The courts in Brown and Banana had an opportunity to consider whether adverse trial publicity 
was a basis upon which an order for the stay of criminal prosecution could succeed. 
                                                          
23 Banana v Attorney General 35. 
24 Banana v Attorney General 39. 
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It is common cause that Brown was subject to scathing pre-trial reporting. As noted in 
§1.1 above, he was labelled a thief who stole billions from widows and orphans. The media 
went so far as to suggest that there was already a verdict against him. Brown argued that his 
right to be presumed innocent and his right to a public hearing before an independent and 
impartial court were violated and that there was no remedy short of a stay available to him. 
In deciding the matter, the court had to consider the nature of the crime and the nature 
of the alleged prejudice. The court acknowledged the pre-trial publicity of which Brown 
complained, and made a determination that it amounted to adverse pre-trial publicity which 
was prejudicial to him. However, the court found the prejudice suffered by Brown was not trial 
related. In dealing with the Brown’s argument that any appointed judicial officer would be 
biased against him as a result of the detailed media reports on the matter, the court expounded 
upon the infallibility of judges and found that they were unlikely to be influenced by extraneous 
matters and would make a finding only on the facts before them.25 
It is submitted that the court in Brown erred in several respects. Firstly, the court made it 
clear that: 
The accused ought not to apply for a stay in prosecution on the ground that he or 
she is likely to be prejudiced by external factors.26 
The court found, in essence, that trial by media or adverse pre-trial publicity is not a ground 
upon which a stay of prosecution may be sought. In so doing, it confined the right to a fair trial 
to the procedural aspects of section 35(3) of the Constitution. Secondly, it did not extend the 
right to a fair trial to non-trial related prejudice, as per the decision in Sanderson. Finally, when 
the court found that the applicant did not show actual trial related prejudice caused by the 
adverse pre-trial publicity, it did not suggest a remedy less drastic than a stay. The result was 
that the applicant was left without a remedy. 
In Banana, the court similarly found that the pre-trial reporting was prejudicial to the 
accused. The court then had to decide whether the accused had established, on a balance of 
                                                          
25 Brown v National Director of Public Prosecutions 79-82. 
26 Brown v National Director of Public Prosecutions 66-67. 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za
72 
probability, that there was a real or substantial risk that he would not obtain a fair trial.27 The 
court made the following concession regarding the effect of pre-trial publicity on judges: 
I am inclined to think it a fallacy to assume that trial judges cannot be affected by 
persistent outside information of a prejudicial nature. Judges are mortals with 
human frailties.28 
However, the court found that the determination of the existence of a real and substantial risk 
of partiality is negated by the availability of mechanisms in the criminal justice system designed 
to protect the fairness of the trial.29 It is clear that the judge in Banana relied upon these inbuilt 
mechanisms of the criminal justice system to ensure the fairness of the trial rather than on his 
role as judicial officer. In the absence of such mechanisms or where they are inadequate, the 
independence and impartiality of judicial officers cannot save the trial and a stay of proceedings 
ought to be granted. 
In both judgments, the courts’ refusing a stay of criminal proceedings was based on the 
rationale that judges have dealt successfully with such matters in the past (Brown), and if it is 
accepted that that there is a real or substantial risk of judges being influenced by extraneous 
concerns, it would be impossible find an impartial judges to hear high profile cases (Banana). 
These are untenable reasons. The failure of the state to protect judges in the performance of 
their duties and to ensure that they are free from outside interference and inducements 
constitute lacunae in the legal system. The media should be held accountable for their actions, 
but it appears that neither the courts nor the state is willing to do so, and would rather protect 
freedom of expression than safeguard the integrity, independence and impartiality of the 
judiciary. 
The courts in Brown and Banana placed too much weight and reliance on the position of 
judges. It is implicit in their position that judges should be independent, impartial, competent 
and diligent, have integrity and treat all people equally who appear before them.30 However, to 
                                                          
27 Banana v Attorney General 35. 
28 Banana v Attorney General 37. 
29 Banana v Attorney General 39. 
30  The Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct 2002. 
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imagine that they will not be influenced by what they read and hear about those appearing 
before them is a fallacy. 
The matter of Shaik should nullify the misconception that judges are not influenced by 
what they read and hear in the media. The Mail & Guardian, in reporting on the judgment in 
Shaik, published an article quoting Judge Hilary Squires as saying that there was a generally 
corrupt relationship between Deputy President Jacob Zuma (as he then was) and Durban 
businessman, Schabir Shaik.31 The SCA in Shaik found, astonishingly, that: 
Between 1996 and 2002 Shaik and Mr Jacob Zuma engaged in what the trial court 
appropriately called "a generally corrupt relationship" which involved frequent 
payments by Shaik to or on behalf of Zuma.32 
Judge Squires never made this remark in his judgment and in a letter to the Business Day he 
complained about the persistent misattribution by the media of that phrase to him. In a 
newspaper article titled Zuma, the SCA and the "generally corrupt relationship" Phrase, it was 
reported that the Registrar of the SCA had issued a statement to the media saying that “that the 
SCA erred in ascribing the words ‘a generally corrupt relationship' to the trial court". The 
statement acknowledged that the quoted words had been ascribed "incorrectly and 
regrettably" to the trial judge.33 
The media had misquoted Judge Squires and the SCA attributed the same incorrect 
quote to the trial judge! It no longer can be accepted, therefore, that judicial officers are free 
from external influences and inducements despite all the qualities of a judicial officer as set out 
in Brown and Banana. The decisions of the courts in Brown and Banana fall short of the 
principles governing applications for stay of criminal proceedings as expounded in Broome and 
Sanderson in that neither judgment considers any remedies short of a stay of criminal 
proceedings. 
 
                                                          
31 Mail & Guardian (1 June 2005). 
32 Shaik and others v S (2007) 2 All SA 150 (SCA) 154. 
33 Politicsweb (15 November 2006). 
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4.5 Conclusion 
The right to prosecute vests in the state and the courts are unlikely to interfere with its 
discretion to institute criminal proceedings unless the continuation of such prosecution would 
lead to substantial irreparable prejudice to an accused person, whether such prejudice is trial 
related or non-trial related. 
Adverse pre-trial publicity and trial by media are grounds upon which an application for 
a stay of criminal prosecution may be brought. Such media coverage interferes with the 
functioning of the court, exerting pressure on it to decide a matter in a certain way. The reliance 
placed solely on judges to ensure the fairness of criminal trials in South Africa should be 
revisited. There is sufficient authority for the opinion that judges are not immune to outside 
influences or pressures. It is trite that no person may interfere with or manipulate the outcome 
of cases before courts, whether directly or indirectly. There is an obligation on the state to 
ensure that the judiciary fulfils its functions free from such interference or manipulation. Where 
the state fails to provide the mechanisms necessary to ensure the fairness of a trial, an 
application for the stay of criminal prosecution is the only remedy. 
The approach of the Canadian courts is to be preferred in these cases. The court in 
Regan found that: 
The stay of criminal proceedings is a prospective rather than a retroactive remedy. A 
stay of proceedings does not merely redress a past wrong. It aims to prevent the 
perpetuation of a wrong that, if left alone, will continue to trouble the parties and 
the community as a whole, in the future.34 
Trial by media continues unabatedly in South Africa. Both the state and the courts are unwilling 
to limit the right of the media to freedom of expression and rely instead on the supposed 
infallibility of judges to ensure the fairness of trials. Where it is impossible to give an accused a 
fair trial because “it would offend a court’s sense of justice and decency” to try the accused in 
the circumstances of a particular case, an application for a stay of prosecution should be 
granted.35 This will force the state to enact additional mechanisms to ensure the fair trial rights 
of accused persons, thereby preventing future contraventions by the media. In this way the 
                                                          
34 R v Regan 328. 
35  R v Horseferry Road Magistrates’ Court, ex parte Bennett [1994] 1 AC 42, HL. 
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independence of the judiciary, the principle of open justice and the fair trial rights of accused 
will be protected satisfactorily. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
PRIOR RESTRAINT AND THE SUB JUDICE RULE 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The classical principle of liberty holds that the law is justified in interfering with 
conduct when that conduct threatens the liberty of other persons … No right or 
liberty can be absolute, howsoever important it may be. Law simply regulates the 
lives of people to ensure a society where a person can enjoy his freedoms without 
undue interference.1 
This chapter will deal with prior restraint or “gag” orders and the sub judice rule as measures to 
safeguard the administration of justice in pending court proceedings. When commenting and 
reporting on pending court proceedings, the media should do so responsibly without creating 
any risk or prejudice to the accused or to the administration of justice. The court in Moafrika 
Newspaper correctly held that while the importance of the media reporting on pending court 
proceedings cannot be minimised, it does not mean that the media “can be allowed to trample 
other people's rights and interests”.2 
Prior restraint orders will allow courts to ban the publication of adverse pre-trial 
information before it is released or discussed in the public domain; and the sub judice rule 
provides for criminal prosecution of the media in cases where pre-trial information is already in 
the public domain and such information is found to prejudice or interfere with the 
administration of justice in pending court proceedings. While these types of orders could be 
effective measures against adverse pre-trial publicity or trial by media, there is no denying that 
they amount to censorship which, by its nature, is an extreme intrusion upon free speech. The 
approach of the SCA in Midi Television3 will be analysed critically in this regard and will be 
                                                          
1 Ahmad (2009: 50). 
2 Moafrika Newspaper re: rule nisi (R v Mokhantso and Others) 2003 (5) BCLR 534 (LesH). 
3 Midi Television (Pty) Ltd v Director of Public Prosecutions (WC) (2007) 3 All SA 318 (SCA). 
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contrasted with the decision of the court a quo in Midi Television and with those of the SCA and 
the CC in the matter of SABC v NDDP.4 
Adverse pre-trial publicity or trial by media, as discussed in Chapter Two above, is 
speech that does not warrant constitutional protection. It violates the right to a fair trial, the 
independence and impartiality of the judiciary and the administration of justice, as determined 
in Chapter Three above. The media must be called to account in these cases and prior restraint 
orders and the sub judice rule constitute effective responses to their conduct. 
5.2 Prior Restraint 
A prior restraint is an order which seeks to prohibit speech in advance of publication. For the 
present discussion it may be defined as an interdict to prohibit the media from publishing 
information which will prejudice and interfere with pending court proceedings and the fair trial 
rights of an accused. These interdicts are obtained before the information is in the public 
domain and could be effective measures to protect the judicial process and, consequently, the 
right to a fair trial, as they will prevent prejudice at its inception.5 Prior restraint amounts to 
censorship as courts have to determine whether or not a publication should be released and 
whether it amounts to a violation of the dignity, privacy or fair trial rights of a person. These 
types of orders effectively “gag” the media and are an extreme limitation upon free speech. 
The general rule is that prior restraints are presumed to be unconstitutional and will be 
granted only in exceptional circumstances where the publication is not “pre-eminently of public 
concern and interest and of which the public is [not] entitled to be fully informed” and, in 
addition, will cause substantial harm to the dignity or privacy of an individual.6 The person 
seeking a prior restraint must show also that there are no alternative measures which could 
mitigate the effect of the publicity. Milo, Penifold & Stein explain the basic point of departure in 
matters where a prior restraint is sought: 
                                                          
4 South African Broadcasting Corporation Ltd v Downer SC NO and others (2007) 1 All SA 384 (SCA) and 
South African Broadcasting Corp Ltd v National Director of Public Prosecutions and Others 2007 (1) SA 523 
(CC). 
5 Bernabe-Riefkohl (1995-1996: 279). 
6 Milo, Penfold & Stein (2014: 186). See also Director of Public Prosecutions (WC) v Midi Television (Pty) Ltd 
t/a e-tv (2006) 2 All SA 286 (C) 294. 
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[A] commitment to freedom of expression requires that courts view prior restraints 
as unconstitutional unless exceptional factors are present. Historically, freedom of 
expression and especially the right to a free press have been regarded as 
encompassing, at their very basic level, the freedom to publish first and suffer the 
consequences, if any, thereafter.7 
Media coverage of pending criminal proceedings is in the public interest. The judiciary exercises 
public power and media coverage of criminal trials keeps a check on the judiciary in this regard. 
The media also inform the public of court proceedings and foster understanding and 
constructive discussions of matters before courts. Bernabe-Riefkohl opines that media access to 
criminal trials helps to protect an accused’s right to a fair trial.8 In so doing, the principle of 
open justice is bolstered by a media acting responsibly and in the public interest. 
Adverse pre-trial publicity or trial by media is not expression which is in the public 
interest and serves only the financial interests of media houses. Public interest is not defined 
merely by what is interesting to the public. What is of greater public interest is an independent 
and impartial judiciary which decides cases only on the evidence presented in court. Trial by 
media is expression that interferes with the independence and impartiality of presiding officers, 
influencing or potentially influencing them to decide matters according to public demand and 
not on the evidence before them. Trial by media speaks to the guilt of an accused and discusses 
evidence to be used at trial in the public domain, encouraging speculation on the guilt or 
innocence of the accused. Therefore, it “undermines the fundamental principle of common law 
that every man is presumed to be innocent till proved guilty”.9 This is not sufficient, however, 
to jettison a publication before it reaches the target audience under current South African law. 
The SCA in Midi Television held thus: 
A publication will be unlawful, and thus susceptible to being prohibited, only if the 
prejudice that the publication might cause to the administration of justice is 
demonstrable and substantial and there is a real risk that the prejudice will occur if 
publication takes place. Mere conjecture or speculation that prejudice might occur 
will not be enough. Even then publication will not be unlawful unless a court is 
                                                          
7 Milo, Penfold & Stein (2014: 183). 
8 Bernabe-Riefkohl (1995-1996: 264). 
9 Chauhan (2011: 38). 
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satisfied that the disadvantage of curtailing the free flow of information outweighs 
its advantage.10 
This test laid down in Midi Television is to be applied: 
[W]henever a court is asked to restrict the exercise of press freedom for the 
protection of the administration of justice, whether by a ban on publication or 
otherwise [and], with appropriate adaptation, whenever the exercise of press 
freedom is sought to be restricted in protection of another right.11 
In this matter the DPP of the Western Cape applied for a prior restraint preventing Midi 
Television (e-TV) from broadcasting a documentary dealing with the murder of a six-month old 
baby before the trial had commenced. The Baby Norton Murder Trial, as it was known, 
attracted enormous media attention and caused widespread public outcry. The television 
programme included interviews with persons who were likely to be state witnesses. The DPP 
sought an interdict to prohibit e-TV from broadcasting the documentary until his office had an 
opportunity to view the content and satisfied itself that the programme would not prejudice 
the forthcoming criminal trial. The DPP argued that: 
A broadcast involving the identification of the accused or an indication of the ability 
to identify the accused could materially prejudice its case … that the police have 
already obtained statements from the witnesses interviewed by the respondent … 
that possible discrepancies between statements made to the police and statements 
made during the interview may be held against the witnesses and may thus 
prejudice their evidence and the State's case.12 
Midi Television argued that the request by the DPP amounted to censorship and consequently 
violated its right to free speech. It also argued that there was no law which required it to grant 
access to its material to the DPP before broadcast. In setting out the rights of the state to 
prosecute crime, the Western Cape High Court found that the state has a constitutional 
obligation to prosecute offenders in order to protect the rights of citizens and that it has a right 
to a fair trial. The question was whether the broadcast of the programme would prevent the 
state from complying with its constitutional obligations, thereby violating its right to a fair 
trial.13 The court found in favour of the DPP and granted the restraint. It held that there was 
                                                          
10 Midi Television (Pty) Ltd v Director of Public Prosecutions (WC) 325. 
11 Midi Television (Pty) Ltd v Director of Public Prosecutions (WC) 325. 
12 Director of Public Prosecutions (WC) v Midi Television 296. 
13 Director of Public Prosecutions (WC) v Midi Television 295. 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za
80 
substantial public interest in the murder of the Norton baby and the subsequent arrests 
relating thereto, which was of public concern and in the public domain. However, the events 
surrounding the murder were not in the public domain and not of public concern. Thus, media 
reports detailing events surrounding the offence, including witness statements, should not be 
allowed in the public domain while the matter was being investigated. This, the court held, 
could endanger the lives of state witnesses and hence compromise the state’s right to a fair 
trial, which was not in the interests of the administration of justice.14 
Before turning to the reasoning of the SCA in Midi Television, the judgments of the SCA 
and the CC in SABC v NDPP will be considered to illustrate the different approach adopted by 
the courts in that case. Although SABC v NDPP dealt with the principle of open justice and the 
live broadcast of judicial proceedings, it finds application in the present discussion insofar as it 
relates to the right to a fair trial. In this matter the SABC brought an application to broadcast 
live the appeal hearing of Schabir Shaik. The National Director of Public Prosecutions (NDPP) 
opposed the application, submitting that: 
Two of the charges are the subject of a pending prosecution of Zuma. Many of the 
witnesses who testified in the criminal trial in the present case will be liable to be 
called to testify in the pending matter… the exposure which the applicant proposes, 
or its aftereffects, may inhibit them from testifying, or while testifying, in the Zuma 
trial.15 
The NDPP argued that live coverage of the appeal of Shaik would prejudice the eventual 
criminal prosecution of Zuma in that witnesses may not want to testify or their testimony might 
differ from what was said during the appeal. This would lead to adverse credibility findings 
which could prejudice the case against Zuma. 
The second argument raised by the NDPP was that Zuma’s right to a fair trial may be 
violated in that the appeal of Shaik invariably would involve discussion of Zuma, which may lead 
to the public pronouncing on the guilt of Zuma. The SCA agreed with the arguments by the 
NDPP. It found that: 
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Two of the three charges preferred against the second respondent will also be 
preferred against Zuma. The evidence of those witnesses whose testimony is in 
dispute in the pending criminal appeal will be subject to searching examination and 
very likely trenchant criticism ... The appellate court’s findings on credibility could of 
course be adverse to such witnesses and reported in the press … What must be 
minimised as far as possible, in the interests of justice, is exposure of such witnesses 
that might cause them to refuse to testify in the Zuma trial. And the risk of that 
happening would not necessarily be undone even if the appellate court's credibility 
findings were favourable to them. Similar considerations correspondingly apply in 
respect of witnesses called in the second respondent's defence.16 
With regard to prejudice to Zuma in any prospective prosecution against him, the SCA held 
that: 
Although Zuma's alleged guilt is not in issue in the pending criminal appeal, discussion 
and consideration of the case [of Shaik] will necessarily involve exhaustive reference 
to Zuma and may even appear to the outside observer or listener to portray him as a 
co-accused and even as criminally liable. Obviously it will not be anyone's intention in 
the pending criminal appeal to consider or pronounce upon Zuma's alleged guilt but 
again it is in the interests of justice pertinent to the pending trial to minimise, if not 
eradicate, the risk that popular perception will regard the crucial question in the Zuma 
case as having already been made.17 
The SCA found that live coverage of the appeal hearing of Schabir Shaik would prejudice the 
administration of justice and the fair trial rights of Zuma. This finding was based on the effect 
such proceedings, if broadcast live, would have on witnesses. 
The CC did not differ from SCA and found that “the possible impact on witnesses 
remains a sufficient justification for the Supreme Court of Appeal decision to prohibit live 
broadcasting in this case”.18 In reaching its conclusion, the CC made the following remark 
concerning the conclusions reached by the SCA: 
It is moreover important to bear in mind that, in arriving at their conclusion, the 
Supreme Court of Appeal had the benefit of having before it the entire record of the 
trial proceedings containing, in the words of the Supreme Court of Appeal, "a mass 
of facts and a myriad of factual issues laced with a variety of legal points”.19 
                                                          
16 South African Broadcasting Corporation Ltd v Downer 391. 
17 South African Broadcasting Corporation Ltd v Downer 391. 
18 South African Broadcasting Corp Ltd V National Director of Public Prosecutions 550. 
19 South African Broadcasting Corp Ltd V National Director of Public Prosecutions 548-549.  
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By contrast, the SCA in Midi Television did not have the benefit of a myriad of facts and an 
entire record of trial proceedings before it. The court had no insight into the contents of the 
programme which e-TV intended to broadcast. The DPP did not place sufficient and cogent 
evidence before the SCA to substantiate its case for a prior restraint, as is evident from the 
following passage: 
The DPP did not ask for an outright ban on publication and the reason for that is 
obvious: he did not know what the documentary contained and so he could not say 
that the administration of justice would be prejudiced if it was broadcast. All he 
could say was that the documentary might possibly have that effect, depending 
upon its contents, and he pointed to how that might occur.20 
The DPP was left to speculate on the contents of the documentary, as appears from the 
argument below: 
In their interviews the witnesses might have given accounts that differed from what 
they told the police, with the result that the discrepancies might be used to discredit 
their evidence … the safety of witnesses might be at risk if their identities were 
revealed to the public.21 
The DPP could not show that the conduct of the trial would be compromised by the broadcast 
of the documentary. The court held that if the documentary were broadcast and it was found to 
be unlawful, e-TV would be liable to prosecution, but the broadcaster could not be prohibited 
from broadcasting without grounds for apprehending that it would be unlawful. The DPP could 
not show such grounds. Hence, the relief sought had no basis in law, as the court correctly held: 
But there is no general principle of our law, whether in the common law, or in a 
statute, or to be extracted from the Constitution, that obliged e-tv to furnish its 
material to the DPP before it was broadcast, and least of all a law that prohibited it 
from broadcasting the material unless it could first demonstrate that the publication 
would not be unlawful. The law generally allows freedom to publish and freedom is 
not subject to permission. In the absence of a valid law that restricts that freedom a 
court is not entitled to impose a restriction of its own.22 
A publication which is not yet in the public domain will be unlawful only if the prejudice that 
the publication might cause to the administration of justice is demonstrable and substantial and 
there is a real risk that the prejudice will occur if publication takes place. This requires courts to 
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have insight into the contents of such publication to determine whether it may be released. The 
court in Midi Television clearly did not have any insight into the contents of the documentary 
and therefore was in no position to make a ruling. The decision in Midi Television was therefore 
no more a victory for press freedom than it was a case of the DPP having no arguments to 
substantiate its application for a prior restraint. 
A prior restraint likely will not be appropriate relief to an accused subjected to adverse 
pre-trial publicity or trial by media for two reasons. Firstly, adverse pre-trial publicity or trial by 
media constitutes information already published and therefore prior restraint will serve no 
purpose. Secondly, the accused will require access to all the information contained in a 
publication prior to its release, which is an intrusion on free speech that cannot be justified. 
5.3 The Sub Judice Rule 
The law prohibits publication of material concerning a pending case which will cause 
demonstrable and a real risk of prejudice to the administration of justice. This is known as the 
sub judice rule. Essentially, it is a rule which prevents the prejudicing of pending proceedings. 
Unlike prior restraint, the sub judice rule concerns publications and comments already in the 
public domain. Any comment or publication by the media which causes a demonstrable and 
real risk to the administration of justice in a pending case constitutes the offence of contempt 
of court ex facie curiae. In Midi Television the SCA held that: 
It is an established rule of the common law that the proper administration of justice 
may not be prejudiced or interfered with and that to do so constitutes the offence 
of contempt of court.23 
According to Snyman, contempt of court ex facie curiae consists in unlawfully and intentionally: 
(P)ublishing information or comment concerning a pending judicial proceeding 
which constitutes a real risk of improperly influencing the outcome of the 
proceeding or to prejudice the administration of justice in that proceeding.24 
The sub judice rule and the concomitant crime of contempt of court constitute a limitation on 
the right to freedom of expression. It amounts to censorship as the press must report on 
                                                          
23 Midi Television (Pty) Ltd v Director of Public Prosecutions (WC) 322.  
24 Snyman (2014: 316). 
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pending court proceedings in such a manner as not to prejudice the administration of justice. 
The sub judice rule is, however, an accepted limitation on the right to freedom of expression, 
according to the SCA in Midi Television.25 The court held that the common law rule against 
prejudicing and interfering with the proper administration of justice: 
is now reinforced by the constitutional right of every person to have disputes 
resolved by a court in a fair hearing and by the constitutional protection that is 
afforded to a fair criminal trial. It is not contentious in all open and democratic 
societies and it was not contentious before us that the purpose that is served by 
those principles of law provides a proper basis for limiting the protection of press 
freedom.26 
The purpose of this rule, which is strengthened by the constitutional right to a fair trial and 
the right to a fair public hearing, is to protect the integrity of the judicial process. The SCA 
held thus: 
The integrity of the judicial process is an essential component of the rule of law. If 
the rule of law is itself eroded through compromising the integrity of the judicial 
process then all constitutional rights and freedoms including the freedom of the 
press are also compromised.27 
The continued existence of this rule in South African law is justified and is strengthened 
further by section 165(3), as read with section 165(4), of the Constitution which provides that 
no person or organ of state may interfere with the functioning of the courts and obligates the 
state to protect the courts to ensure their independence, impartiality, dignity, accessibility 
and effectiveness. Maré argues that if the administration of justice is not protected from 
improper interference, it will be impossible for a person to exercise the right to a fair trial and 
the right to a fair public hearing by a court.28 
A publication and comment on pending proceedings can prejudice the administration of 
justice by compromising the integrity of the judicial process. It is submitted that where the 
court refers to the “integrity of the judicial system” it means much more than a mere 
conclusion that presiding officers will not be influenced by what they read and hear in the 
                                                          
25 Midi Television (Pty) Ltd v Director of Public Prosecutions (WC) 322-323. 
26 Midi Television (Pty) Ltd v Director of Public Prosecutions (WC) 323. 
27 Midi Television (Pty) Ltd v Director of Public Prosecutions (WC) 322.  
28 Maré (1996: 2A7). 
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news. What is at stake in these cases, according to Jordaan, is the public interest.29 He argues 
that “the doctrine of contempt exists for the public good (ie to protect the public interest in the 
due administration of Justice)”.30 Therefore, the question to be considered is whether the 
“greater public interest” justifies the publication or comment irrespective of any prejudice that 
may result. Jordaan argues for “there to be no contempt in such circumstances [since], far from 
interfering with the course of justice, such a publication in fact furthers it”.31 This position is 
confirmed in Midi Television, where the SCA held that even where prejudice results due to 
comment or publication concerning a pending case, “the publication will not be unlawful unless 
a court is satisfied that the disadvantage of curtailing the free flow of information outweighs its 
advantage”.32 The advantage in this case is the greater public interest in the due administration 
of justice. 
The question to be considered, therefore, is whether adverse pre-trial publicity or trial 
by media amounts to a publication or comment on a pending matter which causes 
demonstrable and substantial prejudice to the administration of justice. Where prejudice 
results, a determination will be made as to whether the “greater public interest” justifies the 
publication or comment irrespective of the prejudice. 
It is trite that the media are free to report on pending court proceedings. The obligation 
of the media is to foster better understanding of the justice system, to reinforce confidence in 
the criminal process for both offender and victim and, thus, to legitimise the judicial process. 
Trial by media has the opposite effect. As shown in the previous chapters, it creates a lack of 
trust in the process and the integrity of the system is called into question. The media in these 
cases pronounce on the guilt of an accused prior to the actual case being tried in a court of law. 
Inflammatory details that would be inadmissible as evidence in court become public knowledge 
before the trial has begun and the media are willing to pay witnesses to tell their stories before 
they have testified, as happened in Midi Television. In such cases, the media, as the primary 
                                                          
29 Jordaan (1990: 222). 
30 Jordaan (1990: 222). 
31 Jordaan (1990: 222). 
32 Midi Television (Pty) Ltd v Director of Public Prosecutions (WC) 325. 
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source of information, dictate and influence public perception and the accused is tried in the 
court of public opinion. 
Such manner of reporting is certainly interesting to the public but serves an 
entertainment purpose only and, therefore, the prejudice caused outweighs its advantage. In 
Multichoice, the court held that trial by media cannot be in the interests of justice and 
potentially could undermine court proceedings and the administration of justice.33 In Talk Radio 
702, the court held that the prejudging of pending cases was unfair to the accused who is 
entitled to a verdict by a court and not the media. It was unfair also to witnesses and to judicial 
officers.34 The SCA in Midi Television held similarly that: 
It is prejudicial to prejudge issues that are under judicial consideration, it is 
prejudicial if trials are conducted through the media, it is prejudicial to bring 
improper pressure to bear on witnesses or judicial officers.35 
The court in Harber best describes the dangers of trial by media: 
Trial by newspaper is intrinsically objectionable as it would lead to disrespect for the 
law ...  If the mass media are allowed to usurp the function of the courts and judge 
the issues which are to be tried, not only will unpopular causes not get a fair trial, 
but the public will be led to believe that it is easy to find the truth, viz in the popular 
press, and disrespect for the process of the law could follow.36 
Snyman warns also that: “Trial by newspaper is and remains a real danger to a fair and impartial 
disposal of an issue in the judicial process.”37 The key question is when the risk of prejudice will 
be sufficient to constitute the kind of interference with the administration of justice that 
justifies a charge of contempt of court ex facie curiae? 
Where the media publish information and comment on pending cases, including 
evidence to be presented and the likely outcome of the cases, they interfere prima facie with 
the functions of the court. The function of adjudication vests only in the judiciary. Trial by 
media usurps this function by pronouncing on the guilt or innocence of an accused prior to a 
court of law doing so. The next consideration is whether such interference constitutes a real 
                                                          
33 Multichoice (Proprietary) Limited and Others v National Prosecuting Authority 28. 
34 Talk Radio 702 v Gericke (2013) JOL 30239 (BCCSA) 10. 
35 Midi Television (Pty) Ltd v Director of Public Prosecutions (WC) 323. 
36 S v Harber 221. 
37 Snyman (2014: 321). 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za
87 
risk of prejudice. Popular opinion suggests that judges are not influenced by extraneous factors 
but the enquiry does not end there. As noted earlier, there is sufficient authority to suggest 
that judges are not immune to what they see and read in the news. The right to a fair trial vests 
in the accused and in the state representing the people. According to Snyman: 
Parties to a case, and even outsiders, must be satisfied that the court's conclusion is 
based upon information laid before the court in an admissible way only, and not 
upon information or comment concerning the merits of the issue published in the 
media. Once the media is allowed to publish information and comment on a 
pending case, there will always remain at least a suspicion in the mind of the public 
and of a party to the case that the court, in coming to its conclusion, was influenced 
by outside factors.38 
There should exist no doubt in the mind of the accused or of the public that the court reached 
its decision on the facts placed and argued before it. Where the media create such doubt, the 
legitimacy of our courts and our constitutional order is at risk because the credibility of the 
judiciary and the administration of justice will be questioned. Trial by media or adverse pre-trial 
publicity constitutes interference with the function of the courts and results in a real risk of 
prejudice to the fair trial rights of an accused and to the administration of justice. In such cases, 
prosecution of the media for contempt of court ex facie curiae is justified. 
5.4 Conclusion 
Prior restraint orders and the sub judice rule are effective remedies against recalcitrant media 
houses bent on distributing news and information which prejudice the administration of 
justice and the fair trial rights of accused persons. The test expounded by the SCA in Midi 
Television made it more difficult but not impossible for an accused or the state to obtain prior 
restraint orders or pursue criminal charges against the media for breaching the sub judice rule. 
The issue to be considered is simply whether the greater public interest justifies the 
publication or comment, despite the corresponding prejudice. That enquiry is preceded by the 
determination of whether or not the publication or comment results in demonstrable and 
substantial prejudice to the administration of justice or creates a real risk that the comment or 
publication will influence improperly the outcome of pending court proceedings. 
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Adverse trial publicity or trial by media is prejudicial to the administration of justice 
and to the fair trial rights of accused persons.39 Any publication or comment which 
undermines the legitimacy of the courts and threatens the constitutional order cannot be in 
the public interest. Prior restraint orders can stop such prejudice at its inception and the sub 
judice rule will allow for criminal prosecution where prejudice is caused by publications or 
comments already in the public domain. These remedies are accepted limitations upon free 
speech and operate to maintain the rule of law. 
 
 
 
                                                          
39 See Chapters Two and Three and further discussions in Chapter Four. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
6.1 Closing Remarks 
Interest in crime news is usually high and attracts public interest, especially if it concerns 
famous persons or the crime is of a particularly gruesome nature.1At the heart of freedom of 
expression lies the right of every citizen to receive and impart information and to debate 
openly and frankly matters which are of public concern, including matters before the courts. 
The legitimacy of the courts is dependent on media reportage and public scrutiny of judicial 
matters which such reportage stimulates. However, a criminal trial, according to Resta, turns 
easily into a show with strong entertainment value, giving newspapers and broadcasters 
strong commercial incentives to cover it.2 In their pursuit of profit and in seeking to satisfy the 
curiosity of their readers, listeners or viewers, the media regularly resort to trial by media or 
adverse pre-trial publicity, described by Resta as “a playground of a commercially motivated 
media industry that capitalise on the public’s apparently insatiable appetite for all things 
sensational”.3 
There is a fine line between that which is of public interest and that which is interesting 
to the public. According to Resta, the law should “prevent socially valuable activity—such as 
informing the public about the workings of the justice process—from being transformed by 
market pressures into a power without responsibility”.4 At the receiving end of such coverage 
is the accused and, in many cases, the victims of crime as represented by the state. Public 
censure of crime and of accused persons which follows trial by media should not be imposed 
on the innocent. The right to a fair trial requires an accused to be treated fairly from the 
inception of the criminal process, from which point the person suspected of committing the 
crime in question is considered innocent. Any pre-trial process which implies that the accused 
is guilty, including any such process influenced by media reports surrounding criminal 
                                                          
1  Resta (2008: 33). 
2  Resta (2008: 33). 
3 Resta (2008: 64). 
4 Resta (2008: 64). 
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offences, violates the presumption of innocence. Trial by media or adverse pre-trial publicity 
challenges not only the right of an accused to a fair trial but also the integrity of the judicial 
process. 
Despite the availability of remedies, the media in South Africa usually are not held to 
account for their actions and persist with adverse, biased and irresponsible pre-trial reporting. 
Trial by media is nothing more than commercially motivated expression which does not 
warrant constitutional protection. However, the courts have shown a tendency to protect the 
media in these cases, despite the effect of such reporting on the judicial process, the 
administration of justice and the fair trial rights of accused persons. The reason for this is the 
hesitation on the part of judges to recognise their susceptibility to extraneous influences. It is 
not submitted that judges are influenced by what they see and read in the news, but rather 
that they should not be placed in a position where their independence and impartiality are 
questioned as a result of media sensationalism. The media, therefore, should heed the 
warning of Frankfurter J that the “delicate task of administering justice ought not to be made 
unduly difficult by irresponsible print”.5 There should exist no doubt in the mind of the 
accused or the public that the court reached its decision on the facts placed and argued before 
it. Where the media create such doubt, the legitimacy of the courts and our constitutional 
order is at risk because the credibility of the judiciary and the administration of justice are 
called into question. 
6.2 Recommendations 
Under current South African law there are recourses available to individuals, as well as to the 
state, for harm caused by trial by media or adverse pre-trial publicity. Section 165(3) of the 
Constitution holds that no person or organ of state may interfere with the functioning of the 
courts. To this end, section 165(4) obligates the state to protect the courts to ensure their 
independence and impartiality. Contrary to the views expressed by De Vos and Stevenson, 
Midi Television did not abolish the sub judice rule. In fact, the court reaffirmed its existence to 
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protect the right to a fair trial and, in so do doing, preserve the integrity of the judicial process. 
In Moafrica, the Lesotho High Court also made it clear that: 
The sub judice rule is an important and useful process whereby the proper 
administration of justice is protected against extracurial statements which have a 
substantial risk of prejudicing or interfering with pending court proceedings.6 
The media ought to appreciate that there are boundaries when reporting on pending 
criminal matters. This was confirmed by the court in Moafrica: 
When publishing critical comments over pending proceedings the media should do so 
advisedly and with a full sense of responsibility without creating any risk or prejudice 
to those pending court proceedings.7 
Thus, the sub judice rule is available to the state to hold the media accountable for publishing 
information or commentary on pending court proceedings which causes a real and 
substantial risk of prejudice to the administration of justice and the fair trial rights of the 
accused. The consistent application of this rule will ensure that that the provisions of sections 
165(3) and 165(4) of the Constitution are adhered to and will act as deterrents for future 
transgressions by the media. 
Where the state fails to charge the media with contempt of court for breaching the 
sub judice rule, a stay of criminal prosecution is an effective and prospective remedy 
available to an accused person. If the accused satisfies the court that, as a result of adverse 
pre-trial publicity, trial related or non-trial related prejudice exists which will cause 
substantial irreparable prejudice to his trial, the court should grant the stay of prosecution. 
The interest sought to be protected in such cases is the general public interest in the due 
administration of justice. The matter of whether judges are immune to external issues is not 
in question, but rather whether the public is confident that a judgment will be reached only 
on the facts before the court. Where doubt exists, it is submitted that the question to be 
asked is whether it will be possible to give an accused a fair trial in such circumstances, that 
is, whether the trial process will remove the risk of prejudice. Adverse pre-trial publicity or 
trial by media always will raise doubt in the minds of the accused and of the public as to 
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whether a decision was arrived at only on the facts of the matter. Whatever the decision of 
the court, it will be questioned by the public, thereby eroding the integrity of the judicial 
process and, consequently, the rule of law. 
The stay of criminal prosecution is a drastic remedy but, if granted consistently, will 
exert pressure on the state to ensure that the media are prosecuted for publishing adverse 
pre-trial information or conducting a trial by media. 
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